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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-trust Laws-Borah-Van Nuys Act-Damages
In 1936, Congress undertook to strengthen Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, a federal anti-trust law designed to prohibit certain types of price
discrimination. Besides the Robinson-Patman Act, which divided Sec-
tion 2 into several amendments,' the revision resulted in the addition of
another section known as the Borah-Van Nuys Act.2 This latter amend-
ment has been described as a "grotesque manifestation of the scissors
and paste pot method of drafting a potentially drastic criminal statute."3
Like Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, it prohibits price and
service discriminations. Because of the difference in the language of
the statutes, however, conduct which is allowed under Section 2 of the
Robinson-Patman Act may be prohibited under the Borah-Van Nuys
Act. To illustrate, under the former Act a prerequisite to illegality is
two sales involving price discriminations, 4 whereas under the latter Act
a mere contract to make one sale is a violation.5
Perhaps it is because the Borah-Van Nuys Act expressly provides
criminal penalties for violations that early critics concluded that this sec-
tion imposed only a criminal liability on the violator.6 To date, however,
'38 STAT. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
'15 U. S. C. § 13a (1946). It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge
against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or
advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any dis-
count, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time of
such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade,
quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United
States at -prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United
States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in
such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreason-
ably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a com-
petitor.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon con-
viction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
' Oppenheim, Should the Robinso n-Patman Act Be Amended? Robinson-
Patman Act Symposium, C. C. H. 141, 153 (1948).
It has been recommended that this Act be repealed. Oppenheim, Federal Anti-
trust Legislation: Guideposts To A Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH.
L. Ray. 1139, 1209 (1952).
'Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F. 2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939).
'A. J. Goodman and Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890
(D. Mass. 1949).
C "If section 3 were open to enforcement by private litigants, it wvould certainly
give rise to an enormous amount of harassing litigation. Fortunately section 3
seems to be drawn so that only the Government authorities can enforce it. ...
No means of enforcing Section 3 is expressly provided in the Robinson-Patman
Act except criminal actions by the Attorney-General. Except where such rights
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the Department of Justice has made little, if any, effort to enforce this
law, and, as yet, no alleged offender has suffered the authorized fine
or imprisonment.
By 1942, however, injured parties began seeking civil relief under
the Act, and in that year two suits involving damages were decided.
The Federal District Court of Texas, applying the damages provision
of the anti-trust laws to the Borah-Van Nuys Act, stated that damages
could be recovered,7 and in the same year, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit indicated that it would decide the same way if faced
squarely with the issue.8
In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the
Act, stated:
". .. any person who is injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden therein may sue and recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, in-
cluding a reasonable' attorney's fee." 9
Subsequent to this dictum, there has been a noticeable increase in litiga-
tion involving this section of the anti-trust laws.
In 1949, the federal courts decided favorably for the plaintiffs in
three cases on the question of whether damages would be recovered
under the Act, although no awards were actually made.10 In the fol-
lowing year, three courts again stated that damages were recoverable
are expressly given no private litigant can enforce laws of this character." 22
A. B. A. J. 593, 649 (1936). See also Hamilton and Loevinger, The Second
Attack On Price Discrimination: The Robinson-Patinan. Act, 22 WAsn. U. L. Q.
153, 182 (1937) ; Legislation, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 106, 121 (1936) ; Legislation, 85
U. PA. L. Rv. 306, 312 (1937).
" Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E. D. Tex. 1942). "It(section 13a) does not provide in express terms that persons injured by things
forbidden shall have a cause of action but by declaring them unlawful, the person
so injured, I think is entitled to invoke its provisions, if he can allege and prove
injury approximately caused by such violations."
' Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co., 131 F. 2d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1942). "Appellees also argue that section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 USCA 13a, on which the third count of the com-
plaint is based, is a criminal act and not a part of the anti-trust laws within the
meaning of Section 7 of the Sherman Act, giving the right of action for dam-
ages in a civil suit .... There is authority to the contrary. Midland Oil Co. v.
Southern Refining Co., D. C., 41 F. Supp. 436; Kentucky-Tennessee L. &. P. Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728. But the question raised is not necessary
to this case, and we do not decide it."
Apparently, when the court cited the two cases above, it made the understand-
able mistake of confusing section 13(a) of Title 15, U. S. C. (Robinson-Patman
Act) with section 13a of Title 15, U. S. C. (Borah-Van Nuys Act).
' Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 750 (1947).
"0 Two of these cases were dismissed because certain prerequisites to defendants'
liability were not shown. A. J. Goodman and Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg.
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949); Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice and Cold
Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949). In the third case, the defendant's
motion to dismiss was denied. Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent Halvah
and Candies, Inc.. 9 F. R. D. 700 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
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under the Act by the injured party.11 One court reasoned that
inasmuch as the Borah-Van Nuys Act attacked problems of monopoly
and competition in interstate commerce, it was therefore an anti-trust
law to which the treble damages provision of the anti-trust law applied.12
In Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,13 defendants, who sold
dairy products in the Pacific coast states, allegedly acted in concert to
reduce the wholesale price of their ice cream in the Los Angeles area
to an unreasonably low figure. Their motion to dismiss a suit for dam-
ages brought by local competitors was denied, the court stating that
".. . absent a specifically expressed contrary legislative intent . . ." a
civil action would lie for violation of the Borah-Van Nuys Amendment.1 4
Similar conclusions were reached by the federal courts sitting in
California and Illinois in 1951.15
Despite the trend in favor of civil liability under the Act at least one
tribunal has recently taken a contrary view. The District Court of the
District of Columbia, without passing on the question, stated, "The
court is inclined to the view that no action for damages or for an in-
junction is maintainable under the section in question."' 0
The majority appear to have construed the Borah-Van Nuys Act
correctly. The fact that it provides its own penalties does not of itself
preclude civil liability pursuant to other sections of the anti-trust laws.
The Sherman Act is also a criminal statute, imposing like penalties, 17
yet there is no doubt that treble damages can be recovered by parties
injured under it.'8 Section 4 of the Clayton Act,19 which provides for
treble damages, does not limit such awards to injuries resulting from
violations of the Clayton Act, but instead allows them for harm caused
by breaches of the "antitrust laws." Thus it is broad enough to include
the Borah-Van Nuys Act. The legislative history of the Act supports
"1Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950); Balian Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S. D. Cal. 1950); Spence v.
Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950).
"Spence v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950).
" 94 F. Supp. 796 (S. D. Cal. 1950).
14 Id. at 802.
"Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951) ; Hipps v. Bowman
Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE CASES REP. 62,859 (1950-51); F. and A. Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms, C. C. H. TRADE CASES RP. f162,848 (1950-51).
" National Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n.,
108 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
"15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2 (1946).
18 Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-trust Law, 63
N. 3. L. 3. 297 (1940).
'- 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1946). "Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
[Vol. 31
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the conclusion that an action for damages can be maintained under it.2
Although the Borah-Van Nuys Act was undoubtedly intended to be
used primarily as a criminal statute, indications are that it will not be




Approximately fifteen years have elapsed since the Chandler Act
became law and amended the Bankruptcy Act. That Act, in making
substantial changes to the partnership section, seems to have produced
a relative tranquility over the years in that area of the law. But while
the amended partnership section reconciled some earlier conflicts, it
left others to be decided by the courts. This would appear, therefore,
to be an alipropriate occasion to take cognizance of the existing law, its
development, and its conflicts.
Since a partnersip is not defined in the Bankruptcy Act,' its exist-.
ence in fact' must -depend upon the applicable state laws. A partner-
ship is generally looked upon as "an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'3  In fact, this is the
precise definition under the Uniform Partnership Act.4 Every partner
is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business and the
acts of a partner in the ordinary course of the business binds the part-
nership and the partners. Also, partners are liable jointly for the debts
and obligations of the partnership, and liable jointly and severally for
a tort or breach of trust of another partner in the course of the partner-
ship business. Because of these ordinary principles of partnership law,
the "aggregate theory" is usually applied in describing the legal sig-
nificance of a partnership.
The Bankruptcy Act, however, does not strictly adhere to the
-°80 CONG. REc. 9420 (1936). "Mr. Hancock of New York: 'If a vendor is
found guilty of discrimination as provided in this 'bill (Borah-Van Nuys) is he
subject to the aggrieved party for damages or has he committed a crime and
subjected himself to penalty?' Mr. Celler: 'If he violates the Borah-Van Nuys
provision or other provision of the bill, he is subject to penalties of a criminal
nature and has committed an offense.' Mr. Hancock: 'Would he also be liable
for triple damages?' Mr. Celler: 'And he would also have to respond in triple
damages under the provisions of the Clayton Act. Anyone aggrieved can sue."
1A partnership is included within the meaning of the term "person" in the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 11 U. S. C. § 1(23) (1947).
- It must be proved that there is a partnership in fact and not a mere partner-
ship by estoppel, and the burden of such proof falls upon the petitioner. Buck-
ingham v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Fed. 192 (6th Cir. 1904).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. . 59-36 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'Id. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-37 (1943 Recomp. 1950) for rules in
determining the existence of a partnership.
1953]
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"aggregate theory." In the famous case of Francis v. NcNealr Mr.
Justice Holmes, by strong dicta, is said to have committed the United
States Supreme Court to the "aggregate theory." However, in the
later case of Liberty National Bank v. Bear," the court recognized the
"entity theory," and is said by some commentators to have adopted it,7
even though the Supreme Court, in the latter case, explicitly stated that
"the conclusion stated is not in conflict with the decision in Francis v.
McNeal ..... 8 Instead of the constant haggling over the question of
which theory the Supreme Court has adopted, it would be better to
reconcile the cases by limiting their application to the narrow issues of
each case, for the result in each is well recognized today.
By the "entity theory" it is meant that a partnership owns its prop-
erty, and owes its own debts, apart from the individual property of the
members which it does not own and apart from the individual debts of
its members which it does not owe. The Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and
1938 are recognized as generally following the "entity theory," but
the Act of 1938 follows the "entity theory" only on certain particulars,
and not in all phases of partnership bankruptcy. An adequate system
of bankruptcy involves an adoption of both theories for different pur-
poses.
Adjudication as a Bankrupt. The first instance in which the Act
follows the "entity theory" is in providing that a partnership may be
adjudged a bankrupt, as a legal entity separate and distinct from its
partners, either during its continuation or after its dissolution, but be-
fore winding up.9 The "dissolution" of a partnership is the change in
r228 U. S. 695 (1913). The question involved in the case was whether the
trustee of the adjudged partnership could administer the individual estate of a
non-adjudicated partner. In deciding in the affirmative it was stated by way of
dicta that "the notion that the firm is an entity disinct from its members has
grown in popularity, and the notion has been confirmed by recent speculations as
to the nature of corporations and the owners of any somewhat permanently
combined group without the aid of law. But the fact remains as true as ever
that partnership debts are debts of the member~s of the firm, and that the in-
dividual liability of the members is not collateral like that of a surety, but pri-
mary and direct, whatever priorities there may be in the marshalling of assets.
The nature of the liability is determined by the common law, not by the possible
intervention of the bankruptcy act." Id. at 696.
6276 U. S. 215 (1928). The question here was whether a judgment against
the partnership and the individual partners, which was acquired within four
months of adjudication of the firm, but not within four months of the adjudica-
tion of the individual partner, could be annulled as against the partners. Holding
in the negative, the Court emphasized that the partnership is a separate entity
under the Act and that the adjudication of the firm could not involve the adjudi-
cation of a partner as an individual.
'See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act. 4 U. oF Ciai. L. REv. 369. 378 (1937).8 Libertv Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215, 218 (1928).
'11 U. S. C. § 23(a) (1947). The section provides in full: "A partnership,
including a limited partnership containing one or more general partners, during
the continuation of the partnership business or after its dissolution and before the
final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt either separately or jointly
with one or more of its general partners."
[Vol. 31
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the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associ-
ated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.10 There are many causes of dissolution, all of which are
brought out in the Uniform Partnership Act, which has been adopted
in North Carolina.1" Suffice it to say that the bankruptcy of a partner
causes a dissolution of the firm. An adjudication of the firm is allowed
up to the time of winding up because until then the partnership is not
terminated.',
In order to have a partnership involuntarily adjudged bankrupt, it
must be shown that the partnership has committed one of the acts of
bankruptcy.' 3 While, of course, every partner is an agent of the part-
nership for the purpose of its business, he cannot bind the partnership
where he is not apparently carrying on in the usual manner the business
of the partnership, or where he has in fact no authority to act for the
partnership and the third party has knowledge that he has no author-
ity.' 4 Rarely, therefore, will a partner, without the consent of the other
partners, be able to commit an act which will constitute an act of bank-
ruptcy by the firm. Thus, the fact that one partner of a copartnership
embezzles the funds of the firm, and absconds and conceals himself,
constitutes no act of bankruptcy of the firm.' 5 Nor is it an act of
bankruptcy for which a firm may be adjudged bankrupt if one of its
members, out of his individual estate, prefers one of his own or one of
the firm creditors.16 A partner, without the consent of all partners,
cannot make as assignment of partnership property for the benefit of
creditors,'1 nor appoint a receiver,' 8 nor admit in writing the inability
of the firm to pay its debts and its willingness to be adjudged a bank-
rupt.' 9
Directly related with the problem of adjudicating the separate firm
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-59 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-60 (1943 Recomp. 1950). As to when there has
been a "winding up," see In re Pinson, 180 Fed. 787 (N. D. Ala. 1910); Holmes
v. Baker & Hamilton, 160 Fed. 922 (9th Cir. 1908).
"'The acts of bankruptcy are enumerated in 11 U. S. C. § 21(a) (1947).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
" Davis v. Davis, 104 Fed. 235 (S. D. S. D. 1900).
" Mills v. J. H. Fisher Co., 159 Fed. 897 (6th Cir. 1908). Where the partner
applies his separate estate to the payment of a creditor of the insolvent firm, he
thereby gives such creditor a preference over others of the same class, and
commits an act of bankruptcy, which may be made the basis of a petition by other
firm creditors to have him individually adjudged bankrupt.
If a partner commits a firm act of bankcruptcy with firm assets, this will also
be considered an individual act of bankruptcy by the partner. In re Meyer, 98
Fed. 976 (2d Cir. 1899).
", N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
" N. C. GEa. STAT. §§ 59-39(2), (3) (a) (1943 Recomp. 1950).
"fin re Wellesley, 252 Fed. 854 (N. D. Cal. 1917). Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT.§ 59-41 (1943 Recomp. 1950) ("An admission or representation made by any
partner concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his authority as con-
ferred by this article is evidence against the partnership.")
1953]
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an involuntary bankrupt is the question of the effect of one of the part-
ners being an exempt party under the Act. That is, under the Act
neither a wage earner nor a farmer may be involuntarily adjudged
bankrupt.20 Although, however, one of the partners may be a wage
earner or a farmer, it is settled that the partnership may be adjudged
an involuntary bankrupt.21 "One who combines with others in a part-
nership enterprise becomes bound for the payment of the partnership
debts, and his assets will be drawn in to satisfy the partnership debts
even though he may not be a subject of involuntary bankruptcy. 2 2
The result of adjudicating the firm despite the exempt status of a part-
ner is a natural consequence of adherence to the "entity theory." If,
however, the firm itself is engaged in farming, it is not "wholly free
from doubt"23 whether the firm can or cannot be involuntarily ad-
judged.2 It would seem that the policy which exempts farmers should
be extended to exempt a partnership engaged in farming, despite the
strict logic that may be applied to the literal terms of the Act.
Additional questions are whether the partnership can be adjudged
bankrupt as a firm if one of the partners has died; if one of the partners
is insane; or if one of the partners is an infant. It is understood that
individually, the estate of a deceased person cannot be adjudged a
bankrupt.25  It is questionable, because of a conflict of authority,
whether a partnership, one of whose members has died, can be so
adjudged.20 There would seem to be no objection to it other than a
possible interference with the state court's administration of the estate
of the deceased partner. It has been suggested that even though it be
held that there can be no adjudication, that the rights of firm creditors
are not jeopardized. That is, even if the firm cannot be adjudged bank-
rupt, the surviving partner might be individually adjudged bankrupt,
thereby obtaining jurisdiction of the firm property, 7 As to an insane
person, it has been held that his insanity does not preclude the part-
nership, of which he is a member, from being adjudged bankrupt, even
20 11 U. S. C. § 22(b) (1947).
"2Ii re Disney, 219 Fed. 294 (D. Md. 1915) ; Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 8,19
(6th Cir. 1905).
22 Dickas v. Barnes, supra note 21 at 453.
221 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 5.10 (14th ed. 1940).
24 H. D. Still's Sons v. American Nat. Bank, 209 Fed. 749 (4th Cir. 1914) held
that a partnership engaged in farming is exempt. This decision is criticized in
Note, 12 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1914) on the theory that the exemption in the Act
extends only to a "natural person" engaged in farming, and that a partnership
could hardly be construed to be a "natural person."
2" See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 115.07 (14th ed. 1940). The Act has no ex-
press provision to this effect. Section 8 of the Act, however, provides that the
death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate proceedings that have already
begun.
2" Compare In re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565 (S. D. Cal. 1918) with In re Wells,
298 Fed. 109 (S. D. Ohio 1924).271 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 5.07 (14th ed. 1940).
[Vol, 31
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though his insanity affects his adjudication as an individual.2 The
same is true where one of the partners is an infant.29 Generally speak-
ing, therefore, a partnership may be adjudged bankrupt regardless of the
status of a particular partner. This practice is in line with the "entity
theory" of a partnership.
As to who may file a petition in bankruptcy, there is no authoriza-
tion to be found in the Bankruptcy Act for the involuntary adjudica-
tion as bankrupt of a partnership save upon the petition of qualified
creditors.13 0  However, as to a voluntary adjudication, it is settled by
statute that all or less than all the partners, without the joinder or con-
sent of the remaining partners, may file, and the petition is deemed
voluntary insofar as it is filed on behalf of the partnership. 31  No act
of bankruptcy is required upon the filing of a voluntary petition, but
there exists the requirement "that where a petition is filed in behalf
of a partnership by less than all of the general partners, the petition
shall allege that the partnership is insolvent."3 2  The term "insolvent"
has caused some difficulty in the partnership field. While its definition
is set out in the Bankruptcy Act,33 its application to a partnership has
been left to judicial determination. It is now the weight of authority
that "in determining the question of insolvency, the individual property
of the partners should be considered. Where the assets of a partnership,
together with the individual properties of each partner exceed the
liabilities, the partnership is not insolvent." 34  Hence, under a voluntary
petition by less than all the partners,35 or under an involuntary petition
2'In. re Stein & Co., 127 Fed. 547 (7th Cir. 1904).
2' I' re Duiguid, 100 Fed. 274 (E. D. N. C. 1900) ("... it would be idle, how-
ever, for creditors to prove their debts against the infant during his minority for
he could disaffirm them upon reaching his majority.") The case presents a
quaere as to whether a debt for necessities would support a petition of bank-
ruptcy against the infant.
oKaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950). It is
doubtful if a partner qua creditor can file or join in filing an involuntary pe-
tition against his partnership. Cf. Meek v. Centre Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426
(1925), noted in 25 COL. L. REv. 963 (1925).
"11 U. S. C. §23(b) (1947), Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d
594 (9th Cir. 1950).
The Act provides for service of the petition and writ of subpoena upon the
non-joining partners. 11 U. S. C. § 41(a) (1947).
-11 U. S. C. § 23(b) (1947).
a"A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provision of this title when-
ever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have
conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." 11 U. S. C. § 1(19) (1947).
" Note, 14 ST. L. L. REv. 179, 183 (1929). Strangely enough, exempt assets
will be included in determining partnership insolvency. See McLaughlin, Aspects
of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. OF CH. L. Rxv. 369,
373 (1937).
"M.son v. Mitchell, 135 F. 2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943), noted in 29 CORN. L.
R-v. 244 (1943). This is the leading recent case on this proposition.
1953]
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alleging an act of bankruptcy where insolvency is a requirement, 0 it
must be shown that none of the partners are solvent in the sense of
being able to pay both his own and the firm debts. Clearly this view
applies the "aggregate theory" and indicates that the Act does not
purport to follow any one theory in a strict sense.
Since a partnership can be adjudged bankrupt as a separate entity,
it naturally follows that the partners as individuals can be adjudged
under either an involuntary or a voluntary petition. The Act has taken
the procedure one step further, and thereby settled a conflict of author-
ity, 7 by expressly providing that a partnership may be adjudged bank-
rupt either separately or jointly with one or more or all of its general
partners.38 A more workable practice is thus allowed by giving the
option of a separate or a joint peition. If a separate petition is filed
against the partnership, this may be made into a joint petition against
the partnership and the individuals by amendment, 9
There is one instance, however, under the Act when a firm will be
adjudged bankrupt without a specific petition against the partnership.
If all the general partners are adjudged bankrupt as individuals, this
will automatically cause an adjudication of the firm.40 It is logical and
proper that this result should follow. By the adjudication of the in-
dividuals, the total of the interests of the partnership has been drawn
into the administration of the bankruptcy court, hence the practical
consequences take on a formal recognition under the Act. Note that
under this rule "it is possible, in effect, for a partnership to be an in-
voluntary bankrupt even though it has not committed an act of bank-
ruptcy. This result follows where each of the partners has committed
an individual act of bankruptcy, as distinguished from a firm act of
bankruptcy, and has in consequence been the subject of an involuntary
petition and adjudication. In such a situation the firm also would be
adjudged a bankrupt. '41 Again it is evident that the Act does not
strictly adhere to the "entity theory" for this rule is a wholesome appli-
cation of the "aggregate theory."
Administration of Estates in the Bankruptcy Court. Adjudication
"o Acts of ,bankruptcy Nos. 2, 3 and 5 require that the partnership be insolvent
at the time the act is committed. 11 U. S. C. § 21(a) (1947). Note that act
No. 5 uses "insolvency" in both the bankruptcy and the equity sense.
' See Comment, 87 U. PA. L. Riy. 105 (1938).
" 11 U. S. C. § 23(a) (1947) (involuntary petition); 11 U. S. C. § 23(b)
(1947) (voluntary petition).
Where a joint involuntary petition is filed, it would seem that the require-
ments as to the number of creditors and the amount of debts would be satisfied
where the allegations are adequate as to the firm itself. See Mills v. J. H. Fisher
Co., 159 Fed. 897 (6th Cir. 1908).
" It re Russell, 7 F. 2d 508 (D. Del. 1925). For details as to the form
of the petition, see 1 COLLIeR, BANKRUPTCY 1 5.12 (14th ed. 1940).
"11 U. S. C § 23(i) (1947).
1I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 15.13 (14th ed. 1940).
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as a bankrupt is not always a prerequisite to the administration of an
estate in the bankruptcy court. In other words, it is settled that the
trustee of a bankrupt partnership may administer the estate of a non-
adjudicated partner.42 It has been suggested that the administration of
the non-adjudicated partner's estate is compulsory upon the firm trus-
tee.43  To 'date this point has not been decided, but it would seem that
in the usual instance it would be highly desirable to so administer the
estate. Only in this manner can the firm trustee effectively determine
what assets are available for the firm debts and what assets must be
returned to the partner for distribution to his separate creditors.
Where, however, an individual partner or less than all the partners
are adjudicated bankrupt, the trustee of the individual estates may not
administer the estate of other partners,4 4 nor may he administer the
partnership property in bankruptcy. 45 There is this exception: Where
there is consent on the part of the non-bankrupt partner or partners,
the partnership property may be administered in the bankruptcy court
even without its adjudication.46 That is, where one or more, but not
all of the partners are adjudged bankrupt and the other partner or
partners are solvent, the firm remains out of bankruptcy and its prop-
erty does not come in except by express or implied consent of the
solvent member or members.47  Whether there has been consent will
depend upon the facts of each case, but where the solvent partner allows
the trustee to take possession of the partnership property without assert-
ing his claim, he will be held to have consented to the administration
in the bankruptcy court. 48  Even though there is no consent, and con-
sequently no administration of the firm assets in the bankruptcy court,
the non-bankrupt partners are directed to "settle the partnership busi-
ness as expeditiously as its nature will permit and account for the in-
terest of the general partner or partners adjudged bankrupt." 49  This
naturally follows since the bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the part-
nership and gives the non-bankrupt partners the right to wind up the
2 Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
"
2 Note, 29 CoL L. REv. 1134 (1929).
"Marnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley, 218 Fed. 45 (5th Cir. 1914).
42 11 U. S. C. § 23(i) (1947). This provision does not conflict with other
statutory allowances that a partnership may be adjudged bankrupt either separately
or jointly with one or more or all of its general partners. This provision deals
with the problem where a partner but not the firm is in bankruptcy. In this
situation the problem facing the court is getting jurisdiction, not of the firm, but
of the partner's interest in the firm.
Nor does subsection (i) conflict with subsection (d) for the latter is merely
permissive in nature.
"Id.
' Sturn v. Ulrich, 10 F. 2d 9 (8th Cir. 1925); In re Filman, 177 Fed. 170
(7th Cir. 1910).
"Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950).
"11 U. S. C. § 23(i) (1947).
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partnership affairs in a state court without the interference of the bank-
ruptcy court.50
There is no problem concerning the administration of estates where
all partners are adjudged bankrupt for it has been previously indicated
that in that instance the firm is also adjudged bankrupt.
Trustees. The provision in the Act pertaining to the appointment
of trustees underwent a substantial overhauling under the Chandler
Act in 1938. The amended section provides:
The creditors of the bankrupt partnership shall appoint the trus-
tee, who shall be the trustee of the individual estate of a general
partner being administered in the proceeding: Provided, how-
ever, that the creditors of a general partner adjudged a bank-
rupt may, upon cause shown, be permitted to appoint their sepa-
rate trustee for his estate .... 51
It is to be noted that before the firm creditors can exercise the pre-
rogative which is granted them, the partnership must have been ad-
judged bankrupt. Also, even where special circumstances are shown
for the appointment of a separate trustee for an individual bankrupt, a
prior adjudication of the individual partner is a condition precedent to
the authorization of a separate trustee. On the other hand, the non-
adjudication of the individual partner is ineffective to prevent an ad-
ministration of his estate by a trustee appointed by the firm.52 Unless
an unusual circumstance is shown, it would ordinarily be in the interest
of an orderly and unified administration that only one trustee be ap-
pointed. It has been held, however, that if the interests of the part-
nership and partner estates are in substantial conflict, 3 or if the assets
of the separate estate have so far been depleted that firm creditors have
no possible concern therein,"4 a separate trustee may be allowed.
It is apparent that whenever both the partnership assets and in-
dividual assets are being administered together, the trustee or trustees
should keep separate accounts of the different properties. The Act so
provides.5 5 The real purpose of such a rule is to enable the determina-
tion of what amount of the assets of each type of property will be avail-
able for firm or individual debts.
Marshalling and Distribution of Assets. The Act provides that the
bankruptcy court "may marshal the assets of the partnership estate
50N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-67 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
11 U. S. C. § 23 (c) (1947).
See note 42 supra.
" In re Currie, 197 Fed. 1012 (E. D. Mich. 1910) (allowed under the equitable
powers of the court prior to the amended subsection).
54In re Wood, 248 Fed. 246 (6th Cir. 1918) (allowed under the equitable
powers of .the court prior to the amended subsection.).
"11 U. S. C. § 23(e) (1947).
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and individual estates so as to prevent preferences and secure the
equitable distribution of the property of the several estates."' 6  This
provision is procedural and is applicable only to estates that are being
administered.57 The substantive rules of -distribution under the Bank-
ruptcy Act5" are in line with the rules in the Uniform Partnership Act,59
which follow the theory that partnership creditors shall have priority on
partnership property and separate creditors on individual property.
Prior to adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that firm creditors could share equally with in-
dividual creditors in the partners' estates,60 the theory being that since
the statute at the time made the general partners jointly and severally
liable for he debts of the partnership, 61 the effect was "to convert the
creditors of the firm into individual creditors of each member of the
partnership." 62  The clear and uneqivocal language of the present
statutes would surely warrant an opposite result today. At least there
is no indication that a bankruptcy court in North Carolina would follow
any rule other than that provided in the Bankruptcy Act.
In each instance of the marshalling of assets there naturally arises
the problem of differentiating firm assets from individual assets, and
firm debts from individual debts. No concrete rule can be set forth
for every situation but it is true that "all property originally brought
into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by purchase or
otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership property" ;6
and "unless the contrary intent appears, property acquired with part-
nership funds is partnership property."64  As to the differentiation of
the debts, much will depend upon the use of the benefits erived from
a debt and the determination of whether credit was given to the firm or
the individual. The problem of distinguishing the debts is naturally
made more complex by the retirement of a partner, the sale of an in-
interest by a partner, and the death of a partner.6 5
" 11 U. S. C. § 23(h) (1947). The term "preference" undoubtedly has the
same meaning as that term in § 60(a) of the Act.
In re McConnell v. Williams, 32 A. B. R. 589 (1914).
1l U. S. C. § 23(g) (1947).
N. C. GEaN. STAT. § 59-70 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 123 S. E. 89(1924) ; Rankin v. Jones, 55 N. C. 169 (1855) ; Hassell v. Griffin, 55 N. C. 119
(1855).
" Under the present statutes the partners are liable jointly and severally for
the torts and breaches of trust of a partner, and liable jointly for all other debts
and obligations of the partnership. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1943 Recomp.
1950).
" Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 821, 123 S. E.
89, 92 (1924).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-38 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
"Id. For a discussion of the problem of differentiating the assets, see 1
CoLLiFR, BANKRUPTCY 5.29 (14th ed. 1940). For a related problem and its
remedies, see Note, 49 YALE L. J. 686 (1940).
" For pertinent statutory provisions see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-71 et $eq.(1943 Recomp. 1950).
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It is recognized that in some cases there may be a joint and several
liability on the part of the partners so that a creditor may file proof
against both the partnership assets and individual assets. Thus, where
notes are made by the bankrupt firm and indorsed by an individual
partner, also a bankrupt, they are debts provable against both firm and
individual estates."6 The same is true where the individual partner is
joint maker with, or surety for, the partnership;07 or where all the part-
ners signed in their individual names an obligation executed in con-
nection with a partnership transaction. 68 Where there eixsts this joint
liability, the creditor may share in the individual estates of the several
partners on an equality with exclusively individual creditors,"9 and the
creditors, after the receipt of a dividend from the partnership estate,
might prove for the balance of his claim against the bankrupt estate of
the individual partners that were individually liable.70
The reduction of a partnership debt to judgment against the part-
nership and the individual members does not change the inherent char-
acter of the debt, nor make it "joint and several" so as to enable the
creditor to share on an equality with the individual creditors in the
individual estates.7 1
Effect of Discharge of the Partnership on Unadjudicated Partners.
"[T]he discharge of a partnership shall not discharge the individual gen-
eral partners thereof from the partnership debts. ' 72 This rule is justly
the subject of severe criticism. 73 "A discharge of the firm 'entity,'
leaving the partners fully liable at law is a plain absurdity; and under
the doctrine of administration of all separate estates, there is no reason
why the unadjudicated partners should not be granted a discharge. 7 4
Since the partners' estates are considered in measuring firm solvency,
and the partners themselves submitted to most of the burdens of bank-
ruptcy through the administration of their estates in the firm proceed-
ings, it does seem incongruous to deny the discharge of a non-adjudi-
cated partner from the firm debts after all creditors' rights have been
satisfied. The existing rule "will have the practical effect of forcing
the individual member to seek protection in the less desired form of
adjudication under voluntary proceedings."7 5
"Roiso . Seaboard Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 667 (3rd Cir. 1918).
'~Bank of Reidsville v. Burton, 259 Fed . 218 (4th Cir. 1919).
Robinson v. Seaboard Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 667 (3rd Cir. 1918).
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Keeble, 20 F. 2d 84 (4th Cir. 1927).
of In re McCoy, 150 Fed. 106 (7th Cir. 1906). This method is disapproved
of in 6 -REmiNGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2917 (4th ed. 1937).
"' Cutler Hardware Co. v. Hacker, 238 Fed. 146 (8th Cir. 1916).
7211 U. S. C. § 23(j) (1947).
71 See Comments, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 105, 112 (1938); 49 YALE L. J. 908,
924 (1940).
Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 908, 924-5 (1940).
' Comment, 87 U. PA. L. Rxv. 104, 114 (1938).
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Where a partner is adjudged bankrupt there is specific statutory
authority enabling him to get a 'discharge from both his individual and
partnership debts.78 Adjudication is therefore a condition precedent
to discharge. An important objective of the Act is achieved under this
rule, viz., to enable the debtor to start anew unhampered by old obliga-
tions.
ROGER B. HENDRIX
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Federal Excise and Occupational Tax
on Wagering
The occupational tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 19511 which
levy a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers and
require such persons to register with the collector of internal revenue
were recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court as a valid
7- 11 U. S. C. § 23(j) (1947).
1 IxT. REv. CODE § 3285:
"(a) Wagers. There shall be imposed on wagers, as defined in subsection
(b), an excise tax equal to 10 per centum of the amount thereof.
"(d)" Persons liable for tax. Each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting, wagers shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter
on all wagers placed with him. Each person who conducts any wagering pool or
lottery shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all wagers
placed in such pool or lottery.
"(e) Exclusions for tax. No tax shall be imposed by this subchapter (1) on
any wager placed with, or on any wager -placed in a wagering pool conducted by,
a parimutuel wagering enterprise licensed under State law, and (2) on any
wager placed in a coin-operated device with respect to which an occupational tax
is timposed by section 3267."
INT. REv. CODE § 3290:
"A special tax of $50 per year shall be paid by each person who is liable for
tax under subchapter A or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf
of any person so liable."
INT. REV. CODE § 3291:
"(a) Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall
register with the collector of the district-
(1) his name and place of residence;
(2) if be is liable for tax under subchapter A, each place of business where
the activity which makes him so liable is carried on, and the name and place of
residence of each person who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his
behalf; and
(3) if he is engaged in receiving wagers for or on 'behalf of any person liable
under subchapter A, the name and place of residence of each such person."
INT. REv. CODE § 3294:
"(a) Failure to pay tax. Any person who does any act which makes him
liable for special tax under this subchapter, without having paid such tax, shall,
besides being liable to the payment of the tax, be fined not less than $1,000 and
not more than $5,000.
"(c) Willful violations. The penalties prescribed by section 2707 with respect
to the tax imposed by section 2700 shall apply with respect to the tax imposed
by this subchapter."
INT. REv. CODE § 2707 provides that willful violations such as failure to give
the information required by law, shall subject such person to a fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment of from one to five years or both.
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exercise of federal taxing power.2 The decision arose on appeal from
a district court's ruling3 that the provisions contravened the Tenth
Amendment4 in that Congress was attempting to regulate the purely
state matter of gambling under the guise of a taxing statute. In re-
versing this decision the Supreme Court held that the occupational tax
was a valid revenue measure;5 that its ancillary registration require-
ments were reasonable provisions to facilitate the collection of the
tax; and that the information required in registering was not a denial
of the privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.0
The difficulty in determining when the power to tax should be cur-
tailed because its use results in regulatory effects beyond the direct
legislative power of Congress is brought about by the inherent nature
of a tax itself as well as Constitutional requirements.7  It is obvious
- United States v. Kahriger, 73 Sup. Ct. 510 (1953).
'United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. Pa. 1952). Six other
district courts sustained the validity of Subchapter B (occupational tax) of the
Act. United States v. Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9 (S. D. Cal. 1952); United States
v. Nadler, 105 F. Supp. 918 (N. D. Cal. 1952) ; United States v. Robinson, 107
F. Supp. 38 (E. D. Mich. 1952) - United States v. Arnold, Jordan, and Wingate,
No. 478, E. D. Va., Sept. 18, 1952; United States v. Penn, No. 2021, M. D. N. C.,
May 1952; Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D. C. D. C. 1952); United
States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136 (N. D. Ga. 1952). Combs v. Snyder, supra,
was affirmed in 342 U. S. 939 (1952) on the doctrine of unclean hands; the
constitutional question was not raised.
'"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. X.
' The district court did not contend that the occupational tax as such was
invalid. "A careful consideration ... convinces this Court that the subject matter
of this legislation so far as revenue purposes is concerned is within the scope
of Federal authorities." United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E. D.
Penn. 1952). It has long been settled that a federal tax is not invalid because
it may be levied on an occupation or transaction unlawful under state laws.
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950) (marihuana) ; Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U. S. 506 (1932) (certain classes of firearms) ; Nigro v.
United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928) (narcotics); United States v. Doremus, 249
U. S. 86 (1919) (same) ; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U. S. 1866) (dealers
in liquor and lottery tickets).
6 "No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. The Court pointed out that the
privilege has relation only to past acts, not to future acts that may or may not be
committed. If the defendant wished to take wagers subject to excise txes he
must pay the tax and register and in doing so he is not compelled to confess to
acts already committed, but is merely informed by statute that in order to engage
in the business of wagering in the future he must fulfill certain conditions. A de-
tailed discussion of self-incrimination is beyond the scope of this note, but it must
be emphasized that regardless of their constitutionality the registration provisions
do afford harmful evidence to state law enforcement officers. See note 24, hnfra.
'The federal taxing power is granted in U. S. CoNsT. ART. I. § 8: "The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . to lay and collect Taxes, Duties. Imposts and Ex-
cises. to nay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States: but all Duties, Imoosts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.. . ." In addition to the uniformity requirement for
excise taxes the only other express limitations are that direct taxes must be
imnnse.- by rules of apportionment and that there can be no tax on imports from
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that it would be impossible to levy taxes which do not have social and
economic consequences of a non-fiscal character. Therefore, in its
selection of persons, objects, or transactions which are to bear the in-
cidence of taxation Congress must necessarily consider policies of a
nature other than revenue.8 The Court has recognized that these col-
lateral results will inevitably follow taxation and has not interfered with
revenue legislation merely because Congress has been motivated in part
by non-fiscal policies in deciding just what segment of the nation's
economy or society should be effected by such results.9
This refusal to inquire into the ultimate effects of the taxing laws,
or into the ulterior motives or purposes of Congress in enacting them
arises also from the Court's fear of allowing its judicial power to en-
croach upon legislative domain.10
On the other hand, the ostensible taxing power to create results and
control in matters not within the direct control of Congress has not been
allowed to go unchecked. The Tenth Amendment has been invoked
to invalidate revenue measures when the Court felt that it was necessary
any state. U. S. CONST. ART. I § 9. Further limitations have been implied from
the due process clause of U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. Thus defective methods
of valuation, assessment, collection or remission may amount to lack of procedural
due process. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337 (1937). Substantial
due process may be violated where there is an attempt to make a tax law un-
reasonably retroactive. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927). The most difficult limitation to define, however,
is the one implied by the Tenth Amendment which is the topic of this note.
' That the framers of the Constitution clearly realized this aspect of the taxing
power, and assumed that Congress should and would consider such effects, is
evident from Alexander Hamilton's statement in The Federalist, No. 12. After
pointing out the revenues which could be derived from a national tax on liquor,
he added: "That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend
to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to
the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of society." See
Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18 MINN. L.
REv. 759 (1934).
' "From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, con-
sidered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize
by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment." Magnano v. Hamilton,
292 U. S. 40 (1934). United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950) ; Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U. S. 506 (1937); Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332(1928) ; Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928); United States v.
Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1903);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869) ; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall.
462 (U. S. 1866).
"- In answer to the contention that it is the duty of the judiciary to invalidate
the exercise of the taxing power whenever it seems to the Court that the power
has been abused the Court in McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1903)
replied: "But this reduces itself to the contention that, under our constitutional
system, the abuse by one departement of the government of its lawful powers is
to be corrected by the abuse of its powers by another denartment." Much earlier
the Court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno. 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869) had said: "The
power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility
of the legislature is not to the courts. but the neople by whom its members are
elected." See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1869) and cases
cited note 9 supra.
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to exercise its quasi-political duty of preserving the traditional separa-
tion of state and federal powers.1
The test to determine whether a particular exercise of power pur-
porting to be a revenue measure'2 falls within federal or state boundaries
seemingly involves an objective examination of the statute to decide
whether or not it is actually a tax.' 3 Thus, if the act can be fairly said
to be for the purpose of collecting revenue1 4 and its penal or regulatory
features are reasonably incidental to fiscal purposes the enactment is
deemed a tax and upheld.' The fact that Congress ha'd ulterior mo-
1" Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) ; United States v. Butler,
267 U. S. 1 (1936) ; United States v. Constantine, 297 U. S. 287 (1935) ; Trusler
v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926) ; Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 (1925);
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U. S. 20 (1922);
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
" Congress has in several instances used its taxing power as an alternative
method of regulation in fields where it has the plenary power to regulate di-
rectly. The authority of such cases to sustain the general use of federal taxing
power to effect results in matters beyond the delegated power of Congress is,
therefore substantially weakened. However, because of their sweeping and
emphatic language as to the scope of revenue power two of such cases are often
relied on without distinction. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869)
(tax on state bank notes-power to regulate currency); Hampton v. United
States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928) (protective tariff-power to regulate foreign com-
merce).
" The test of "objective constitutionality" is clearly set out in McCray v.
United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1906): "Undoubtedly, in determining whether a
particular act is within a granted power, its scope and effect are to be con-
sidered. Applying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on their
face they convey a tax. That being their necessary scope and operation, it follows
that the acts are within the grant of power." And in Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U. S. 506 (1937) the Court said: "On its face it is only a taxing measure . . .
it has long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to
be an exercise of the taxing powers is not the less invalid because the tax is bur-
densome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed." But cf. United States v.
Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935) ; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor
Tax Case), 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
"' It is obvious that from a practical standpoint a tax which is designed to
end the activity with respect to which it is imposed cannot be said to be for
the purpose of collecting revenue. This contention was raised in connection with
the validity of a ten cent per pound tax on yellow oleomargarine which would in
effect end its production. However, McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27
(1906) upheld the tax saying that on its face it was clearly a revenue measure.
Cf. Veazie Bank v. Fenno. 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869). A similar problem arises
when the tax is not prohibitive, but purely nominal. In United States v. Doremus,
249 U. S. 86 (1919) the Court upheld a one dollar per year tax upon narcotic
dealers though there were elaborate ancillary provisions as to registration re-
quirements and records. After the same act was amended so as to increase rates
the Court in Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928) stated that any doubt
as to the invalidity of the tax as it originally stood had been removed by the
change from a norminal to a substantial tax. See Brown, When Is a Tax Not a
Tax. 11 IND. L. J. 399 (1936).
15 Examples of regulatory provisions held reasonable: United States v. Sanchez,
340 U. S. 42 (1950) (tax on transfer of marihuana-regulations imposed much
heavier tax on transfers to persons not registered in compliance with the act);
Sonzinsky v. United States. 300 U. S. 506 (1934) (tax on firearms with an-
cillary registration renuirements) ; Doremus v. United States, 249 U. S. 86 (1919)
(tax on narcotics-all dealers in drus required to register; sales to be made
on nre'rribd forms issued by the Treasury Department): Alston v. United
States. 274 U. S. 209 (1927) (same) ; Felsenberg v. United States, 186 U. S. 126
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tives other than revenue and that the tax actually results in regulation
or discouragement of the activities taxed does not impair its validity.'6
But if the Court from an on-the-face examination of a particular
statute determines that the tax or its ancillary regulations constitute
primarily an effort to regulate or destroy matters beyond Congressional
control it will classify the enactment an imposition of a penalty rather
than an exercise of the power to tax.' 7  In such case legislative motives
are considered but only as they are evident in the express language
of the statute itself.'
8
The net result seems to be that if the act is actually a tax the power
of Congress cannot be denied except for the limitations placed upon the
(1901) (tax on tobacco-coupons, premiums or gift certificates could not be at-
tached to packages) ; In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 536 (1899) (tax on sales on boards
of trade-regulation required written memorandum of sale with names of parties,
etc.).
"
0 Cases cited notes 9 and 15, supra.
"' Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) held invalid a 15% excise
tax on bituminous coal which provided for an exemption for operators who
accepted codes of fair competition prescribed by the act. The Court said this
was clearly a penalty for non-compliance with regulations rather than a revenue
measure. United States v. Butler, 267 U. S. 1 (1936) involved a tax levied on
processors of cotton with a provision that the proceeds could be employed for
the purpose of removing surplus agricultural products from the market. Held:
invalid because the expenditure clause showed the immediate purpose of the act
to be regulation of agriculture. United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287
(1935) dealt with a federal tax of $25 on the business of a retail dealer in malt
liquor which stipulated that there was to be a tax of $1000 if the business was
conducted in violation of state law. The Court held that the larger tax was
clearly a penalty to enforce state laws. Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5
(1925) held that a doctor could not be convicted under the narcotics tax law for
having prescribed in the ordinary course of professional service doses of drugs
to an addict without written application as required. The specific requirement
was held to have no reasonable relation to the collection of revenue. Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U. S. 20 (1922) held
invalid a 10% tax upon the net income of those who knowingly employed children
below certain ages. Pointing out the element of scienter and the fact that the
tax did not vary with the amount of the thing taxed the court held that the
purpose of the enactment was clearly to impose a burden on those who did not
comply with an elaborate code of regulations set forth in the act. Hill v. Wal-
lace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922) invalidated a tax of 20 cents a bushel placed on grain
sold on future contracts except when sold on boards of trade operating under
regulations provided for in the act. See also Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475
(1926). Where Congress has used its taxing power to regulate matters in which
it has expressly delegated powers to deal directly, the "taxes" have often been
deemed penalties, thus greatly changing the type of procedure permissible in en-
forcement. See, e.g. United States v. La France, 282 U. S. 568 (1930) ; Lepke
v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922).
18 United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. Pa. 1952) relied solely
on United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935), in holding that the occupa-
tional tax on wagerers was an attempt to punish violation of state law. The
obvious distinction as pointed out by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Kahriger, 73 S. Ct. 510 (1953) is that the penalty provisions of the wagering
tax applies to those who do not comply with the tax, irrespective of whether his
state laws permit wagering or not. The penalty exaction in the Constantine case,
supra, was on its face imposed only on persons who were dealing in liquor con-
trarv to state law. But cf. United States v. Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9 (S. D. Cal.
1952). See Note, 14 U. OF Pir. L. REv. 71 (1952).
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taxing power by the Constitution in express terms.19 Although this
doctrine of "objective constitutionality" does not afford a completely
satisfactory explanation of the Court's decisions on the extent of federal
taxing power it appears to be a rational classification for the most part.2U
From a strictly objective viewpoint of the occupational tax on
wagerers it is not surprising that the Supreme Court had no difficulty
in deciding that it is a valid exercise of the taxing power. On its face
the act appears to be designed primarily for the production of revenue.
21
The registration provisions of the statute can certainly be declared as
essential aids in the collection of the tax on wagering as well as for
necessary identification of the taxpayer.2 2  The penalty provisions can
be classified as permissible measures adopted for the enforcement of the
tax and its provisions.
23
On the other hand, one would have to ignore reality in order to fail
to recognize that Congress has devised a means to regulate and prohibit
wagering in all the states where it is illegal. The gamblers are faced with
the choice of subjecting themselves to prosecution under the state crim-
inal laws by complying with the act or going to federal prison for
willfully violating it.2 4 That such an inevitable result was a primary
10 See note 7 supra.
20 Some authorities have found the distinctions drawn by the Court between
a tax and a penalty untenable. Corwin, Constitutiotal Law in 1921 and 1922, 16
Am,. POL. Scr. REv. 613 (1922) ; Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through
Taxation, 18 MINN. L. REV. 757 (1934). See, however, Brown, The Excise Tax
As a Regulatory Device, 23 Cornell L. Q. 45 (1937) ; Powell, Child Labor, Con-
gress and the Constitution, 1 N. C. L. Rev. 61 (1922).
21 See note 1 supra. It had been estimated that the annual revenue to be de-
rived from the wagering and occupational taxes would be $400,000,000. H. R.
REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1951).
22 See note 1 supra. The registration provisions of the tax were explained by
the Committee Reports as follows: "The committee conceives of the occupa-
tional tax as an integral part of any plan for the taxation of wagers and as
essential to the collection and enforcement of such a tax. Enforcement of a tax
on wagers frequently will necessitate the tracing of transactions through complex
business relationships, thus requiring the identification of the various steps in-
volved. For this reason, the bill provides that a person who pays the occupa-
tional tax must, as part of his registration, identify those persons who are
engaged in receiving wagers for or on his behalf, and, in addition, identify the
persons on whose behalf he is engaged in receiving wagers." H. R. Rs.N.586,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1951) ; SEN. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 118
(1951).
21 See note 1 supra.
2" "Each collector shall . . . place and keep conspicuously in his office, for
public inspection, an alphabetical list of the names of all persons who shall have
paid special taxes within his district, and shall state thereon the time, place, and
business for which such special taxes have been paid, and upon application of
any prosecuting officer of any State, county, or municipality, he shall furnish a
Certified copy there of . . ." INT. REv. CoDE, § 3275; made applicable to occu-
pational tax on wagerers by INT. REv. CoDE, § 3292. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in United States v. Kahriger, 73 Sup. Ct. 510 (1953) says: "In addition to
the fact that Congress was concerned with activity beyond the authority of the
Federal Government, the enforcing pr6vision of this enactment is designed for
the systematic confession of crimes with a view to prosecution for such crimes
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purpose and motive of Congress in passing the enactment is too obvious
to be denied.25
Conceding that the suppression of professional gambling would be
of great moral benefit to our society it is still difficult to regard an
attempt at such accomplishment under the guise of a revenue measure
to be in the best interests of public policy.26 An enactment which in
return for the payment of an occupational tax purports to grant to
the taxpayer the privilege of performing certain acts but which actually
and designedly subjects him to punishment for their performance can-
not be viewed as a rational or good-faith use of the federal taxing
power. And yet in view of the fact that all taxation inevitably results
in economic and social regulation to some extent and that extreme
deference is due Congressional use of its delegated power to tax it is
submitted that the United States Supreme Court has adopted the better
policy in upholding the Wagering Tax Act. The real solution lies in
the hope that in the future Congress will make a more reasonable use
of its delegated powers and that the states will make a more effective
use of their police powers.
THOMAS W. STEED, JR.
Damages-Fraud and Deceit-Recovery of Punitive Damages for
Fraud and Deceit
One segment of the law of damages not frequently -discussed is the
question of assessing punitive damages in an action of fraud and deceit.
North Carolina has recently considered this question in a case of first
impression.1
There the plaintiffs, aged Negroes without education, were induced
to buy a tract of land from the defendant as a result of false and
under State law." Justice Black, also dissenting, calls the act "a squeezing device
contrived to put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a state
prison as a violator of state gambling laws." United States v. Kahriger, supra.
" There are many instances in the Congressional debates prior to the passage
of the tax where the suppression of gambling was discussed. For instance see
97 CONG. REc 6892 (1951):
"Mr. Hoffman of Michigan. Then I will renew my observation that it might
if properly construed be considered an additional penalty on the illegal activities."
"Mr. Cooper. Certainly, and we might indulge the hope that the imposition
of this type of tax would eliminate that kind of activity."
" Although concurring in the majority opinion upholding the wagering taxes
Justice Jackson said: "But here is a purported tax law which requires no re-
ports and lays no tax except from specified gamblers whose calling in most states
is illegal. It requires this group to step forward and identify themselves, not
because they like others have income, but because of its source .... It will be a
sad day for the revenues if the good will of the people toward their taxing system
is frittered away in efforts to accomplish by taxation moral reform that cannot
be accomplished by direct legislation." United States v. Kahriger, 73 Sup. Ct.
510 (1953).
" Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 73 S. E. 2d 785 (1953).
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fraudulent representations by defendant's agent that the lot was 268 feet
wide and 160 yards deep and worth $2,000, when in fact it was only 80
by 150 feet and worth no more than $500. After having paid the pur-
chase price, the plaintiffs learned the truth, and sought in this action
to recover $1,500 actual damages, and an additional amount as punitive
damages. The jury awarded the actual damages prayed for and also
$1,500 punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
as to actual damages but reversed that portion which allowed punitive
damages. It held that before punitive damages could be awarded "there
must be an element of aggravation accompanying the tortious conduct
which causes the injury."'2  After finding that facts were not sufficient
to warrant the allowance of punitive damages, the Court further stated
that "there was no evidence of insult, indignity, malice, oppression or
bad motive other than the same false representations for which they
have received the amount demanded. Here fraud is not an accompany-
ing element of an independent tort but the particular tort alleged. '' 3
The North Carolina Court has previously adopted this "element of
aggravation" criterion for the assessment of punitive damages in vir-
tually all classes of tort actions without discrimination.4 And in many
cases the word "fraud" has been used as one of these elements upon
which punitive damages may be predicated.5 The Court in the principal
*Id. at 725, 73 S. E. 2d at 787.
*Id. at 727, 73 S. E. 2d at 788.
* Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d
894 (1943) (wrongful conversion of automobile) ; Lay v. Gazette Publishing Co.
209 N. C. 134, 183 S. E. 416 (1936) (libel) ; Baker v. Winslow, 184 N. C. 1, 113
S. E. 570 (1922) (slander) ; Ford v. McAnally, 182 N. C. 419, 109 S. E. 91 (1921)
(malicious prosecution) ; Hodges v. Hall, 172 N. C. 29, 89 S. E. 802 (1916)
(assault and battery) ; Carmichael v. Soutbern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 157 N. C.
21, 72 S. E. 619 (1911) (wrongfully removing the telephone from plaintiff's prem-
ises) ; Arthur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 393, 73 S. E. 206 (1911) (blasting) ; Williams
v. Carolina & Northwestern Railroad Company, 144 N. C. 498, 57 S. E. 216
(1907) (negligence); Ammons v. Railroad, 140 N. C. 196, 52 S. E. 731 (1905)
(wrongfully ejecting plaintiff from defendant's train).
These cases all state in effect the general rule applicable in actions of tort
as announced in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 107,
13 S. Ct. 261, 263, 37 L.Ed 97, 101 (1893) where the court said that punitive
damages are recoverable in tort actions, ". . . if the defeildant has acted wantonly,
or oppressively, or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations; but such guilty intention on the part of the de-
fendant is required in order to charge him with exemplary or punitive damages."
It should be noted that this general rule is the one applied by the court in the
prinscipal case. Cf. Smith v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N. C. 151, 156, 74 S. E. 961,
964 (1912).
Typical of the language used is, "Punitive damages are never awarded, ex-
cept in cases 'when there is an element either of fraud, malice, . . . or other causes
of aggravation in the act or omission causing the injury,'" Holmes v. Central
Carolina Railroad Co., 94 N. C. 318, 323 (1886). The following cases use either
the same or substantially the same language quoted: Hairston v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corporation, 220 N. C. 642, 645, 18 S. E. 2d 166, 168 (1942); Harris v.
Queen City Coach Co., 220 N. C. 67, 69, 16 S. E. 2d 464, 465 (1941) ; Robinson
v. McAlhaney, 214 N. C. 180, 184, 198 S. E. 647, 650 (1938) ; Tripp v. American
Tobacco Co., 193 N. C. 614, 616, 137 S. E. 871, 872 (1927).
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case relies upon only two North Carolina decisions as the bases of its
holding regarding punitive damages,6 and both of these cases were de-
cided on the issue of slander. Since punitive damages are assessed for
the purpose of punishing the defendant for his "outrageous conduct, ' 7
i.e., willful and wanton, etc., the requirement of some aggravation seems
to be well founded where the action is grounded upon libel and slander.8
However, where the action is brought on the theory of fraud and deceit,
some doubt arises as to the soundness of requiring this element of
aggravation in addition to establishing the cause of action. Before a
plaintiff can prevail in an action of fraud and deceit, he must have
shown that the defendant, or his agent, has made an untrue statement,
knowing it to be untrue, and intending that the plaintiff shall act upon
it.' That the ill-will, malice, or bad motive necessary to subject a de-
fendant to an assessment of punitive damages may appear either by
direct evidence or from the inherent character of the tort itself, would
seem to follow without dispute.10 Is not then fraud and deceit such a
tort that by its very nature should expose the perpetrator to the possi-
bility" of having to pay punitive damages?
Other jurisdictions are not in harmony on this question. In the
absence of a controlling statute, it appears that a majority of the courts
'Baker v. Winslow, 184 N. C. 1, 113 S. E. 570 (1922) ; and Cotton v. Fish-
eries Products Co., 181 N. C. 151, 106 S. E. 487 (1921).
Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 726, 73 S. E. 2d 785, 787 (1953).
See McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N. C.
L. REv. 129 (1930). Cf. Binder v. General Motors Acceptanme Corporation, 222
N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894 (1943) ; Cotton v. Fisheries Products Co., 181 N. C.
151, 106 S. E. 487 (1921).
It would appear from the two cases last cited, that the injury caused the
plaintiff by way of humiliation, etc., furnishes some motivation for the court to
allow punitive damages.
a It is quite clear that one may act in complete good faith, and still be liable
in such an action for actual damages. See Lay v. Gazette Publishing Company,
209 N. C. 134, 183 S. E. 416 (1936).
' The elements necessary for a right of action in fraud and deceit are well
established. There must be a statement made by the defendant; that statement
must be untrue in fact; the defendant must either know that it is untrue, or be
culpably ignorant (that is, recklessly and consciously ignorant) of whether it is
true or not; it must be made with the intent that plaintiff shall act upon it; and
the plaintiff must act in reliance on the statement in the manner contemplated
and thereby suffer damage. Small v. Dorsett, 223 N. C. 754, 28 S. E. 2d 514
(1944) and cases cited therein.
Thus it is apparent that the action of fraud and deceit is inherently different
from that of libel and slander. The former requiring a conscious and intentional
wrongdoing.
"0 "It must be shown either that the defendant was actuated by ill-will, malice,
or evil motive (which may appear by direct evidere of such motive, or from
the inherent character of the tort itself, or from the defendant's oppressive or in-
solent demeanor, sometimes called 'circumstances of aggravation'). . . . " Mc-
Cormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Danages, 8 N. C. L. REv.
129. 134 (1930).
"' Punitive damages are not awarded as a matter of right. This determination
rests exclusively within the sound discretion of the jury. Tripp v. American
Tobacco Co.. 193 N. C. 614, 618, 137 S. E. 871, 873 (1927) and cases cited therein.
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deciding the point have applied the same general rule as that adopted
by the North Carolina Court in the principal case. 12 However, a
minority of the jurisdictions allow the jury to assess punitive damages
without requiring the additional element of aggravation. 3 California,
Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas have seen
fit to modify the general rule applied in torts cases regarding punitive
damages, and have, by statute and judicial interpretation, authorized
their assessment upon a showing of actionable fraud. 14
" Hollins v. Nalls, 58 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1952); Lutfy v. R. D. Roper and
Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P. 2d 161 (1941); Laughlin v. Hopkinson, 292
Ill. 80, 126 N. E. 591 (1920) ; Kluge v. Ries, 66 Ind. App. 610, 117 N. E. 262
(1917) ; Russell v. Stoops, 106 Md. 138, 66 Atl. 698 (1907); Sovereign Camp,
W.O.W. v. Boykin, 182 Miss. 605, 181 So. 741 (1938); Oehlhof v. Solomon, 73
App. Div. 329, 76 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1902) ; Long v. McAllister, 275
Pa. 34, 118 AtI. 506 (1922) ; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438 (1862).
It should be noted that a number of the courts adhering to this "majority view"
have stated that gross fraud is an aggravating circumstance upon which punitive
damages may be predicated. Hollins v. Nalls, supra; Laughlin v. Hopkinson,
supra; Russell v. Stoops, supra; Soverign Camp, W.O.W. v. Boykin, supra. This
term has been defined as, "representations made with a knowledge of their
falseness (or so recklessly made as to amount to the same thing), and with the
purpose of injuring the plaintiff." Southern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Dinsmore,
225 Ala. 550, 552, 144 So. 21, 23 (1932). Thus it would appear that a jury
would be justified in finding that gross fraud was present, where the plaintiff has
done no more than, establish mere actionable fraud.
3Bower v. Perkins, 135 Conn. 675, 68 A. 2d 146 (1949); District Motor
Co. v. Rodill, 88 A. 2d 489 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952); Jones v. West Side
Buick Auto Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 93 S. W. 2d 1083 (1936) ; Saberton v. Green-
wald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N. E. 2d 224 (1946).
"' California: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." CAL.
Civ. CODE § 3294 (1949), Thompson v. Modern School of Business and Corre-
spondence, 183 Cal. 112, 190 Pac. 451 (1920).
Colorado: "In all civil actions in which damages shall be assessed by a jury for
a wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the injury com-
plained of shall have been attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or insult,
or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, such
jury may, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, award him
reasonable exemplary damages." COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 50 § 6 (1935). While the
Colojrado Court has yet to decide the direct issue, it has held that implied malice
is sufficient to allow punitive damages under this statute. McAllister v. McAllister,
72 Colo. 28, 209 Pac. 788 (1922) (suit for alienation of affections). Thus it
appears that when the issue presents itself, the Colorado Court will reach the
same result as those states following the "minority rule."
Montana: The language of the statute here is substantially that of the California
statute set out above. MONT. RFv. CODES ANN. § 17-208 (1947). The exact issue
has likewise failed to present itself to the Montana Court. However, from the
wording of the statute and the decision in Moelleur v. Moelleur, 55 Mont. 30,
173 Pac. 419 (1918), it is likely that this court too will authorize punitive damages
where actionable fraud is shown.
North Dakota and Oklahoma: The statutes in both these states employ essentially
the same wording as does the California statute, supra. N. D. REV. CODE § 32-0307
(1943) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (1937). Wuest v. Richmond, 48 N. D.
1081. 188 N. W. 573 (1922); Garrett v. Myers, 190 Okla. 273, 123 P. 2d 965
(1942).
Texas: After defining actionable fraud, and stating the measure of damages, the
statute continues ". . . all persons wilfully making such false representations or
promises or knowingly taking the advantage of said fraud shall be liable in ex-
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As to the measure of damages in actions for fraud and deceit, there
are two rules that the courts have basically followed: (1) the "benefit of
bargain" rule, and (2) the "out of pocket" rule. 15
Under the "benefit of bargain" rule, the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover the difference in the value of what he received and the value which
it would have had had the representations been true.16 Therefore, in
those jurisdictions following this doctrine, as well as the proposition
that punitive damages are not allowable except under circumstances
of aggravation, where the plaintiff prevails in his cause of action the
defendant will be required to pay the plaintiff more than his actual loss
in situations where the price paid is less than the falsely represented
value, even though no punitive damages are assessed.' 7  However,
where the price paid is the same as the falsely represented value, the
plaintiff recovers only the amount he paid above the true value, and the
defendant goes unpunished. Consequently, when this measure of dam-
ages is combined with the principle that punitive damages are allowed
by simply showing actionable fraud, it becomes obvious that the de-
fendant in the former situation will be punished twice for one wrongful
act.
Conversely, in those jurisdictions where the "out of pocket" rule
is accepted (by which the plaintiff is entitled to the difference between
the amount paid and the actual value of that which he received)' 8 along
with the theory of requiring additional aggravation for the allowance of
punitive damages, an equally undesirable consequence will result in
many situations. Thus where the court finds that the element of aggra-
vation is wanting, the plaintiff is not made entirely whole; for he must
emplary damages to the person defrauded in such amount as shall be assessed by
the jury, not to exceed double the amount of the actual damages suffered." TaX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4004 (1925), J. S. Curtiss & Co. v. White, 90 S. W. 2d
1095 (Tex. 1935).
"The first rule is applied by the following courts: Lutfy v. R. D. Roper &
Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P. 2d 161 (1941) ; Morrell v. Wiley, 119 Conn.
578, 178 Atl. 121 (1935) ; Menke v. Rovin. 352 Mo. 826, 108 S. W. 2d 24 (1944) ;
Kennedy v. High Point Savings & Trust Co., 213 N. C. 620, 197 S. E. 130 (1938).
The second rule has been adopted in, California by statute. CAL. Crv. CODE§ 3343 (1949) (see note 21, infra). And by the courts in the following jurisdic-
tions: Horning v. Ferguson, 52 A. 2d 116 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1947) ; Peters
v. Stroudsburg Trust Co., 348 Pa. 451, 35 A. Zd 341 (1944).
For a collection of cases as to both rules, see 37 C. J. S., Fraud §143b.
" Kennedy v. High Point Savings & Trust Co., 213 N. C. 620, 623, 197 S. E.
130. 131 (1938).
" This inevitable result is undoubtedly the reason for the Arizona Court hold-
ing that while legal malice, i.e. the intentional doing of a wrongful act withoutjustification or excuse-is a sufficient basis for the awarding of punitive damages,-
such damages should not be allowed where the "benefit of bargain" rule applies,
in the absence of the defendant acting wantonly and recklessly, etc. the court
apparently feeling that the result in this situation would make the plaintiff whole,
and at the same time punish the defendant. Lutfy v. R. D. Roper & Sons Motor
Co.. 57 Ariz. 495. 504, 115 P. 2d 161, 165 (1941).
" Horning v. Ferguson, 52 A. 2d 116, 119 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1947).
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pay the expenses of litigation in order to recover that amount fraudu-
lently taken from him, while a cheat is permitted to go unpunished.
In view of the purpose for which punitive damages are assessed, and
the fact that the plaintiff has a right to be made whole, it appears that
the courts of California and the District of Columbia have adopted the
best view, which more nearly meets the purposes of damages in tort
actions. These jurisdictions apply the "out of pocket" rule for the
measure of damages, 19 and authorize the submission of the issue of
punitive damages to the jury where the plaintiff's evidence tends to show
actionable fraud. 20  By applying this rule the sum wrongfully obtained
will be returned to the plaintiff, and the jury may, in its discretion,
punish the defendant to the degree that the facts of each case warrant.
And by virtue of this punishment, the plaintiff may receive the ex-
penses he incurred in litigation.
From the propositions discussed above, it is concluded that where
the "out of pocket" rule is not applied and punitive damages are not
allowable upon showing actionable fraud, the perpetrator in too many
cases has nothing to lose by his fraud. He stands the chance of making
a dishonest profit if his scheme is successful, but in no event can he lose
by his misconduct. The unfairness of such a result is vividly illustrated
by the principal case. Would it not, then, be advisable for every state
to adopt statutes similar to those in California ?21
1 DURWARD S. JONES
Deeds-Adverse Possession-Tacking-Strip of Land not Included in
Deed
For twenty years or more the successive occupants of two adjoining
tracts of land have been satisfied that the correct boundary between
their lands is a certain ditch, line, fence or hedgerow. Then deeds are
consulted, a physical survey is run, and one landowner realizes that he
is in possession of a strip of land not included in his deed, nor in the
deeds of his predecessors. Convinced that the land is rightfully his, he
claims title by adverse possession, only to be told that he has not held
19 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3343 (1949), Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d 913, 137
P. 2d 500 (1943); Horning v. Ferguson, 52 A. 2d 116 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App.
1947).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1949), Thompson v. Modern School of Business
& Correspondence, 183 Cal. 112, 190 Pac. 451 (1920) ; District Motor Co. v.
Rodill, 88 A. 2d 489 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
2 The California Statute providing for the use of the "out of pocket" rule
states, "One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled
to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the de-
frauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together
with any additional damage arising from the particular transaction." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3343 (1949). The California Statute authorizing the assessment of puni-
tive damages is set out in note 14 supra. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (1949).
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the land long enough in his own right to satisfy the twenty year statutory
period in effect where land is held adversely without a deed.' He must
therefore attempt to show the requisite twenty years of adverse posses-
sion by tacking to his own the adverse possession of his predecessors.
The leading case on this point in North Carolina is Jennings v. White,2
where plaintiff and his two predecessors in possession, A and B, occu-
pied an entire lot, but under deeds in which the description omitted the
southwest corner. Plaintiff sought to establish title to this corner by
adverse possession, but in order to show the twenty years of adverse
possession required to ripen title where the land is held without color
of title, plaintiff had to tack to his own the adverse possession of A and
B. Plaintiff lost, the court holding that as a general rule jossession
could not be tacked to make out title by adverse possession when the
deed under which the last occupant claims title does not include the
land in dispute. This holding was based on plaintiff's failure to show
any privity in respect to the disputed corner between himself and his
predecessors in possession, the court declaring that in order to create
such privity there must have existed as between each successive holder
a relation such as ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee, or devisor
and devisee. Here the court found no such relationship in respect
to the controverted corner, but indicated instead that A, who took from
the plaintiff's remote grantor, was a tenant at will of the remote grantor.
Since A was only a tenant at will, his successors, B and the plaintiff,
presumably could hold no greater estate in the omitted strip of land
than a tenancy at will.3
In keeping with the rule as laid -down in Jennings v. White,4 the
North Carolina court in succeeding cases 5 has consistently refused to
allow a grantee to tack to his own the adverse possession of his grantor
of a strip of land not within the description of the deed. A slight
modification occurred in the recent case of Newkirk v. Porter,6 where
it was stated by way of dictum that a grantee who went into physical
possession of the strip not covered in the deed would become an ad-
verse possessor in his own right and not a tenant at will of his grantor,
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1943).2139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
In labeling A's possession a tenancy at will, the court apparently was in-
terpreting the statute of frauds as allowing only a tenancy at will in this type of
situation.
' 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
'Newkirk v. Porter, 237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953); Locklear v.
Oxendine, 233 N. C. 710, 65 S. E. 2d 673 (1951) ; Simmons v. Lee, 230 N. C.
216, 53 S. E. 2d 79 (1949) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 229 N. C. 270, 49 S. E. 2d 476(1948) ; Boyce v. White, 227 N. C. 640, 44 S. E. 2d 49 (1947).
0237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953).
"This dictum is in accord with the holding in Blackstock v. Cole, 51 N. C.
560 (1859), the only North Carolina case in point prior to Jennings v. White,
139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
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but tacking of the preceding adverse possessions of the non-included
strip nevertheless would not be allowed.
Unlike North Carolina, most jurisdictions 8 hold that, while the
deed alone will not constitute the necessary privity as to the strip not
included in the deed, an express transfer of possession, or of possession
and claim, by grantor to grantee, is sufficient privity to ground the
tacking of their adverse possessions as to the strip not covered in the
deedY These courts apparently find that an express transfer of pos-
ession exists when the grantor indicates to the grantee boundaries which
include both the land described in the deed and the omitted strip and
then puts him in possession of both.10 The North Carolina court, on the
other hand, by not commenting on the circumstances surrounding the
transfer,1 has indicated that it gives no weight to the words and actions
of the parties at the time of the transfer. In none of the cases where
tacking of a strip not included in the 'deed was attempted has our court
determined that an express oral transfer of possession would constitute
sufficient privity.
The court in its decisions 12 has continually emphasized that in
North Carolina the privity sufficient to permit tacking of the non-
'Note, 17 A. L. R. 2d 1131 (1951).
' St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Mulhey, 100 Ark. 71, 139 S. W. 643 (1911); Smith
v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530 (1863); Dubois v. Karazin, 315 Mich. 598, 24 N. W.
2d 414 (1946); Vandell v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N. W. 525 (1889);
Crowder v. Neal, 100 Miss. 730, 57 So. 1 (1911); Alukenis v. Kashulines, 96
N. H. 107, 70 A 2d 202 (1950) ; Helmich v. Davenport, 174 Iowa 558, 156 N. W.
736 (1916).
In these cases the transfer of possession was made by an express declaration
of transfer, or the practical equivalent thereof. In the last case tacking was
allowed even though successive deeds expressly excluded the controversial strip.
" St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Mulhey, 100 Ark. 71, 139 S. W. 643 (1911), where
grantor represented as his own all the land within an inclosure and put grantee
into possession thereof; Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N. W. 142 (1936),
where grantor put grantee into possession of entire tract, indicating hedge as
correct southern boundary, and hedge later turned out to be seven feet south of
correct boundary; Rembert v. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15, 41 S. W. 935 (1897),
when grantor cqnveyed to grantee all her interest in an adjacent strip which
both parties knew was not included in the description in the deed. Shuttles v.
Butcher, 1 S. W. 2d 661 (Tex. 1927), here fences on one side of tract were located
a few feet over onto the adjoining lot, and grantor represented as his own
everything that was under fence.
" The only instance where the court might be construed as having commented
on such circumstances appears in Jennings v. White, 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799
(1905), when it was stated that if the grantor put the grantee into possession of
the entire lot, including the portion not covered in the deed, the grantee in respect
to that portion became the grantor's tenant at will. The court might have been
speaking hypothetically for the facts as reported do not affirmatively indicate
an express transfer.
2Newkirk v. Porter 237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953): Locklear v.
Oxendine, 233 N. C. 710, 65 S. E. 2d 673 (1951) ; Simmons v. Lee, 230 N. C. 216
53 S. E. 2d 79 (1949) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey. 229 N. C. 270, 49 S. E. 2d 47(1948) ; Boyce v. White, 227 N. C. 640, 44 S. E. 2d 49 (1947) ; Jennings v. White,
139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905) ; Blackstock v. Cole, 51 N. C. 560 (1859).
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included strip can be created only through a paper writing describing
the strip or by descent.
That an anomalous situation exists under the North Carolina rule
of Jennings v. White' 3 can be illustrated as follows: Suppose X, own-
ing no other land in the vicinity, adversely holds Blackacre, a small
strip, without any deed. In order to establish title to Blackacre by
adverse possession, X can tack to his own the prior adverse possession
of his predecessor in possession, since an express parol transfer by his
predecessor creates sufficient privity.14  Conversely, suppose X has
purchased a tract consisting of Whiteacre plus Blackacre, but he and
his grantor claim under a deed which does not include Blackacre in its
description. X cannot tack in order to establish ownership to Blackacre
by adverse possession, even though he and his grantor hold under a deed
which at the time of purchase they both thought included Blackacre
in its description; for in this case apparently the express oral transfer
of possession does not create sufficient privity.15 It would appear, then,
that while a grantee who in good faith purchases a tract of land, a strip
of which is not covered by his deed, cannot tack to his own the adverse
possession of his grantor to that strip, one who has purchased nothing
and has no deed but who has been put into adverse possession of this
same strip can tack to his own the adverse possession of his predecessor
and establish his title to the strip.
Since, in the very recent decision of Newkirk v. Porter,16 the court
has reiterated the harsh rule laid down in Jennings v. White,17 it would
seem futile to try to establish title by adverse possession to a strip of
land not included in the deed when it is necessary to tack in order to
show an adverse holding for the twenty years statutory period. It
should be noted, however, that in a Michigan case' 8 involving title to a
strip of land not included in his deed, while the court did not allow the
defendant to tack successive adverse possessions to the strip, he pre-
vailed on the theory of acquiescence. The court -declared that where
successive parties had accepted a line as the correct boundary and on
both sides had used up to the line and no further for a long period of
years, each party is estopped to deny the accepted line as the true line.
This theory of acquiescence might be tried in North Carolina, for our
' 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
'* Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, 812, 90 S. E. 993, 995 (1916) where
Justice Hoke stated, "In order to establish title by adverse occupation there must
be continuity of possession for the requisite statutory period, and, in case of suc-
cessive occupants, there must be some recognized connection between them. This
connection may be effected by deed or will or other writing, or it may be shown
by parol."
' See cases listed in note 11, supra.1c237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953).
17 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
" Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926).
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Court approved the doctrine in a previous case where a strip of land
not covered in the deed was the subject of the controversy.19
EARLE GENE RAMSEY
Divorce-Alimony-Permanent Alimony Incident to Absolute Divorce
The recent case of Feldman v. Feldman,' following close on the
heels of Livingston v. Livingston2 and involving the same procedural
question, once again explains the status of North Carolina law on the
subject of permanent alimony as an incident to an absolute divorce
decree. The plaintiff, husband, instituted an action for absolute di-
vorce on the grounds of two years' separation. Subsequent to the filing
of the complaint but prior to the decree for absolute 'divorce, the parties
made an agreement whereby the plaintiff was to pay the defendant a
monthly sum for the support of herself and the child of the marriage.
This agreement was entered as a consent order. Thereafter a decree
for absolute divorce was granted. Some years later the plaintiff ceased
to make the monthly payments. The defendant, after notice, moved that
the plaintiff be adjudged in contempt of court and the plaintiff moved to
strike the consent order. Upon hearing the plaintiff's motion, the lower
court relying on Livingston v. Livingston, supra, ruled that the consent
order was inoperative as an order of the court. The Supreme Court
in affirming the decision points out that the consent order (permanent
alimony) was not reduced to a court judgment or decree before the
commencement of the suit for absolute divorce and consequently did
not come within the protective provision of G. S. 50-11.3
"In Roman Catholic times, that is, until the reign of Henry VIII,
marriage was regarded by the church as a sacrament, and as therefore
indissoluble. This being the view of the canon law, it was applied by
the ecclesiastical court in England, which had jurisdiction over matri-
9 In Hanstein v. Ferrell, 149 N. C. 240, 62 S. E. 1070 (1908), ownership of a
narrow strip between two city lots was in question. The plaintiff and his pred-
ecessors in title and the defendant had both acquiesced in a boundary line
formed by a common trench caused by water dripping from the eaves of two
wooden buildings formerly on the premises. The court held that recognition of,
and acquiescence in a line as the true boundary line of one's land, not induced
by mistake, and contained through a considerable period of time, affords strong,
if not conclusive, evidence that the line so recognized is the true line.
1 236 N. C. 731, 73 S. E. 2d 865 (1952). In the even later case of Merritt v.
Merritt, 237 N. C. 271, 74 S. E. 2d 529 (1953), the same procedural point was
raised. There the husband and wife had consented to the continuance of a separa-
tion agreement for alimony after the absolute divorce which was then in suit.
The court citing the principal case held the alimony liability was contractual only
and could not be enforced by contempt as it had been decreed incident to the
absolute divorce rather than prior to the commencement of the said suit.
2235 N. C. 515, 70 S. E. 2d 480 (1952).
N . C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1949, recompiled 1950).
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monial causes. ' 4 These courts did, however, grant a divorce a mensa et
thoro,5 which legally authorized the separation of the parties without
disturbing the bonds of matrimony.6 As the marital status was not
thereby destroyed, neither were the common law incidents of marriage.7
Accordingly, after a divorce a mensa the husband continued to enjoy
the usual rights to the various property interests of his wife,8 while she,
in turn, continued to hold her inchoate right to dower and, if without
fault, was awarded a reasonable amount of alimony.9
Although the ecclesiastical courts could not dissolve a valid marri-
age, they could, in an action then called divorce a uinculo matrimoni'0
declare the marriage void ab initio" where, due to certain impedi-
ments, 12 a valid marriage never existed. Accordingly, the common law
duty of a man to support his wife was decreed to have never existed
and consequently the court was without a basis upon which to award
alimony.' 3  In contradistinction to these courts, Parliament could, by
special act, grant an absolute divorce dissolving a valid marriage, but
due to the expense involved in obtaining such a divorce, it was a privi-
lege of the wealthy.1 4 Few divorce bills were passed at the instance of
the wife; therefore, no definite practice was set as to alimony awards
incident to an absolute divorce.' 5 However, there were several cases
'MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoEsnc RELATIONS § 81 (1931).5 Ibid.
'Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its
Present Stautory Structure, 6 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1939).
" MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 257.
82 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 409 (2 ed. 1923)(. . . the husband can deprive his wife of the enjoyment of her land by alienating
it, and . . . it will be valid at least so long as the marriage lasts."). See also
Bird v. Bird, 1 Lee 209, 212, 161 Eng. Rep. 78, 79 (1753), where Sir George Lee
in granting the wife alimony pendente lite said, ". . . under that marriage he had
a right jure mariti to possess himself of Whatever she had . .")
'Otway v. Otway, 2 Phill. Eec. 109, 161 Eng. Rep. 1092, 1093 (1813) (".
the wife is the injured party; she is separated from the comfort of matrimonial
society, from the society of her family, nmot by act of Providence, but by the
misconduct of her husband; she must be liberally supported. . . . The law has
laid down no exact proportion; it gives sometimes a third, sometimes a moiety;
according to circumstances."). The alimony was based on the common law
duty of the man to support his wife. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 Atl.
1033 (1913).
"o 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 623 (3d ed. 1922) ; MADDEN,
op. cit. supra note 4 at 257; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. sufpra note 8 at 396.
at 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 10.
12 12 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 686 (1938) ("consaguinity
or the fact that one of the parties was already married . . . physical incapacity to
consummate; . . :).
"3 See Bird v. Bird, 1 Lee 621, 622, 161 Eng. Rep. 227, 228 (1754), which
involved nullity of a marriage because of prior marriage. Eight children were
born to the second marriage. Sir George Lee after pronouncing the marriage
void ab initio said, "As to allowing her a sum of money (though I thought her
case a very compassionate one), I was of the opinion I had no warrant to do it
by law or practice."
'1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 10.
1 See Fisher v. Fisher, 2 Swa. & Tr. 410, 413, 164 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1056 (1861).
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where a divorce bill was sought by the husband and Parliament pro-
vided for the maintenance of the delinquent wife.' 6
In 1857 the jurisdiction over divorce proceedings in England was
by statute removed from the ecclesiastical courts and placed in the
Court for Matrimonial Causes.' 7 The right to an absolute divorce upon
certain grounds was made available' 8 and alimony incident thereto was
left to the discretion of the court.' 9
North Carolina's statutory development of divorce and alimony was
begun some forty-three years prior to England's by the Public Laws of
1814.20 Respecting but not adhering to the doctrine of marriage as a
sacrament, the law provided for an absolute divorce decree 2 1 as well as
a divorce a mnensa et thoro22 and an action for alimony without di-
vorce.2 3  In order, however, that dissolution of the marriage should not
be too readily available, the law produced various obstacles.2 4 Alimony
for the wife upon a decree for absolute divorce, or a divorce a mensa,
was provided for in the discretion of the court. 25  This state of the law
as to alimony incident to absolute divorce obtained for over fifty-five
Id. at 412, 164 Eng. Rep. at 1056.
'r20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
Ibid. Vict., c. 85, § 27.
"o Ibid. See also Fisher v. Fisher, 2 Swa. & Tr. 410, 413, 164 Eng. Rep. 1055,
1056 (1861) (Suit for absolute divorce at the instance of the wife where thejudge ordinary said; "In the present case the wife elects to have the marriage
dissolved ..... .She might have been relieved from the necessity of living with
her husband and have remained his wife, but her election was not to do so. Still,
although she did so elect, having good grounds for complaint, the respondant
may be considered as in some sort depriving her of her position, and the Legis-
lature no doubt intended that she should not seek a remedy at the expense of being
left destitute .... I must take upon myself the arduous duty of deciding what is
reasonable in this case.").
-* N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N. C. 327 (1819)
Reeves v. Reeves, 82 N. C. 348 (1880).
" N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, § 1.
"'N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, §§ 1, 5.
" N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, § 3.
" Some of these impediments were: a ten pound tax on filing the complaint;
security for the cost of the action by the complainant; no absolute divorce decree
valid until ratified by the General Assembly. N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869. No
provision for alimony pendente lite or suit money to the wife. Wilson v. Wilson,
19 N. C. 377 (1837). Strict grounds and meticulous pleading requirement. N. C.
Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, § 2; Whittington v. Whittington, 19 N. C. 64, 77 (1836)("In the ecclesiastical courts of England, the course is to require the libel to state
a perfect case for a divorce, before it is admitted to proof; so that it can never
be helped out by the evidence. This is probably the true meaning of the pro-
vision in our statute . . ."). Defenses of connivance, collusion, condonation or
recrimination closely watched for. N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, § 3; Hansley
v. Hansley. 32 N. C. 506 (1849); Little v. Little, 63 N. C. 22 (1868); Home
v. Home, 72 N. C. 530 (1875). Right to remarry expressly given only to the
innocent party. N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869 § 4. Right of offending party to
remarry expressly denied subject to bigamy punishment for violation. N. C.
Sess. Laws 1827, c. 19, § 5.
" N. C. Sess. Laws 1814, c. 869, § 4, Wilson v. Wilson, 19 N. C. 377, 378,




years26 and the express power to grant alimony, inter alia, appeared in
N. C. REv. CODE c. 39, § 11 (1854) as follows: ".... and the court shall
have power also to decree alimony to the wife in the case of absolute
divorce upon the petition of the wife; and after a sentence nullifying
or dissolving the marriage, all and every the duties, rights, and claims
of the parties, in virtue of said marriage, shall cease and determine;
and the plaintiff, or innocent person, shall be at liberty to marry
again. . . ." [Italics added.] In the session of 1871-1872 the General
Assembly revised the above section and without expressly repealing
the power to grant alimony incident to absolute divorce they simply
omitted it and adopted in lieu of the above quoted language the follow-
ing: "After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all
rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine, and either
party may marry again: .... ,,2 This section has been re-enacted down
to the present and is now part of G. S. 50-11. In construing this statute
our court has held that since one incident of the marriage is the duty
of the man to support his wife, this section by failing to preserve that
duty denies a basis for alimony as an outcome of an absolute divorce
proceeding.2 In 1919 a modification of the law in respect to alimony
was enacted as follows: "That in all cases where an absolute divorce
is granted upon the grounds of separation of husband and wife for ten
(now two) successive years as provided by law, such decree granting
such divorce shall not have the effect of impairing or destroying the
" See Davis v. Davis, 68 N. C. 180 (1873) (Case of absolute divorce on appeal
as to amount of alimony).
"'Provided . . ." (Proviso relates to children) N. C. Sess. Laws 1871-72, c.
193 § 43; N. C. REv. STAT. c. 37, § 15 (Battle 1873). As chapter 193 made no
express statement repealing the power to grant alimony incident to absolute
divorce nor did the title of the act mention alimony (An Act Concerning Marri-
ages, Marriage Settlements and The Contracts of Married Women), the policy
of the Legislature in 1872 as to alimony incident to absolute divorce was not made
clear. However, their attitude as to alimony incident to divorce a mensa seems
to be somewhat modern as they provided a basis for alimony awards to the
innocent hubsand as well as the innocent wife, which, in effect, gave the court
the power to recognize not only the common law duty of the man to support his
wife but in addition a new statutory duty of the wife to support her husband if
the circumstances of the case warranted such a decision. Compare language of
N. C. Sess. Laws 1871-72, c. 193 § 37 with that of N. C. Rav. CoDE c. 39, § 3(1854). Also, alimony pendente lite and alimony without divorce was provided
for the wife. N. C. Sess. Laws 1871-72, c. 193, §§ 38, 39; Webber v. Webber, 79
N. C. 572 (1878); approved in Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N. C. 529, 95 S. E. 857
(1918). Thus, there seemed to be no legislative policy against alimony in general
and if this act did contemplate repealing the power to grant alimony incident to
absolute divorce the logic behind the preservation of dower, year's provision and
share in the personal estate to the innocent wife after absolute divorce (as was
done by N. C. Sess. Laws 1871-72, c. 193 § 42) seems to impeach whatever logic
was behind the denial of alimony incident to absolute divorce, as both are for the
purpose of giving support and maintenance to the wife.
" Merritt v. Merritt, 237 N. C. 271, 74 S. E. 2d 529 (1953) ; Feldman v. Feld-
man, 236 N. C. 731, 73 S. E. 2d 865 (1952) ; Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N. C.
515. 70 S. E. 2d 480 (1952) ; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d 118
(1946) ; Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N. C. 346, 27 S. E. 28 (1897).
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right of the wife to receive alimony under any judgment or decree of
the court rendered before the commencement of such proceeding for
absolute divorce."'29  [Italics added.] This section of the 1919 act,
as amended from ten to two years, appeared as a second proviso to
G. S. 50-11 at the time of the decision in the principal case.30  In effect
this modification was a partial restoration of the law as it existed prior
to 187231 in that it permitted some court directed alimony payments to
be continued subsequent to an absolute divorce. However, this law
required two separate judicial proceedings (the first for alimony, the
second for absolute divorce) in order to obtain the same result which
was reached in one proceeding under the old law. And, further, this
provision only protected the prior alimony award from being destroyed
by the absolute "divorce if it was based on two years' separation; thereby
leaving the absolute divorce based on the other various grounds free to
destroy the alimony -decree entered prior to the commencement of the
action for absolute divorce.32 Conseqently, a wife subsisting on a prior
award of alimony could not obtain an absolute divorce grounded, for
example, on her husband's adulterous conduct without destroying her
court decree for alimony but she could seek her remedy based on two
years' separation without disturbing that decree.33  Although this
modification afforded in some degree a legislative recognition of the
need for extending the husband's duty to support past the decree for
absolute divorce, its restrictive coverage to only one of the several
grounds for absolute divorce and its procedural requirement involving
a multiplicity of suits made it an inadequate protection of the wife.
In the case of Livingston v. Livingston,34 where a consent order for
alimony was, as in the principal case, entered subsequent to the com-
mencement of the absolute divorce grounded on two years' separation,
the court invalidated the consent order as an alimony judgment because
it "was not rendered before the commencement of the present ac-
tion, .. .."35 (as required by the language of the 1919 act above quoted).
The court further stated, "The defendant did not pursue the statutory
2 N. C. Sess. Laws 1919, c. 204, § 1.
" Feldman v. Feldman, 236 N. C. 731, 73 S. E. 2d 865 (1952).
" N. C. REv. CoDE c. 39, § 11 (1854).
"See Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 134, 37 S. E. 2d 118, 121 (1946)
where the court irnterpreting the saving proviso of G. S. 50-11 said: ". .. a prior
award of alimony is protected from annulment by a decree in absolute divorce,
based on tzvbo years' separation, which would otherwise probably have resulted."
[Italics added.]
' It has been argued that the Legislature only intended this section to protect
the prior alimony decree from the destructive effect of an absolute divorce at the
instance of the husband. But the court has held this erroneous and allowed the
wife to pursue her right to an absolute divorce without prejudice to her formerly
decreed right to alimony. Deaton v. Deaton, 237 N. C. 487,-S. E. 2d-(1953).
See also Lentz v. Lentz. 193 N. C. 742. 138 S. E. 12 (1927).
4 235 N. C. 515, 70 S. E. 2d 480 (1952).
"Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N. C. 515, 517, 70 S. E. 2d 480, 482 (1952).
[Vol. 31
NOTES AND COMMENTS
authority for the establishment of her rights to collect alimony from her
husband, but attempted to secure the same results by the filing of a con-
sent order in. her husband's pending suit for absolute divorce. A de-
cree providing for permanent alimony as an outcome of an action for
absolute divorce is in violation of public policy and contrary to the stat-
utory laws of North Carolina."3 6  Clearly an alimony decree, with its
contempt procedure advantage, cannot be upheld when obtained outside
the necessary procedural steps required by statute37 as it would run
counter to the constitutional protection 38 against imprisonment for debt
and thereby violate public policy.39 But in support of an equally sound
public policy, that a person shall not profit by his own wrong, it seems
that the statute" itself violated public policy 4' by not making express
provision for alimony in absolute divorce proceedings. For the ulti-
mate outcome of an absolute divorce at the instance of the injured
wife is the destruction of the marriage because of the husband's mis-
con'duct4 2 which in turn destroys all the incidents of the marriage in-
cluding the wife's right to maintenance. Thus it would seem that the
law, which regards the husband unfit to enjoy the marital relation, not
only destroys the marriage but also, Janus-like, turns its face to the
opposite direction and rewards the husband for his misconduct by
destroying his previously imposed duty to support. The ecclesiastical
"Ibid; citing Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d 118 (1946).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1949). " N. C. CoNsT. Art. I § 16.
" Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d 118 (1496).
See note 37 vipra.
4Parmly v. Parmly, 5 A. 2d 789, 790 (N. J. 1939), where, after stating that
the New Jersey law imposes a continuing duty on the husband to support his
divorced wife, the court said: "The continuing duty of support thus imposed is
grounded in a public policy designed to make for permanence in the marriage
relation, as well as to accord a measure of protection to the innocent wife. The
Legislature has deemed it to be contrary to the public interest to permit the guilty
husband, whose wilful misconduct had brought about a dissolution of the marriage,
to also cast off the duty of support arising from the marriage status." See also
Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334, 347 (1898) where in referring to
a statue which imposed a continuing duty, the court said: "But the statute, for
obvious reasons of public policy and upon equitable grounds, authorizes the
allowance of alimony . . ."; Fickel et. al. v. Granger 83 0. 101, 106, 93 N. E.
527, 528 (1910) ("Alimony is an allowance for support, which is made upon
considerations of equity and public policy.") Likewise in Stearns v. Stearns, 66
Vt. 187, 189, 28 Atl. 875 (1894) the court stated: "It is apparent that such al-
lowance is given for the support to which she was entitled by the marriage, and
which she has been compelled to forego and been deprived of through his default
in failing to perform the marriage contract and covenant."
2 Misconduct of the defendant resulting in injury to the plaintiff is not re-
quired in the divorce based to two years' separation. See Taylor v. Taylor, 225
N. C. 80. 33* S. E. 2d 492 (1945) and cases there cited. However, the plaintiff
cannot obtain a divorce on this ground if the separation was caused by the
plaintiff's own wrong. Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C. 347, 193 S. E. 333 (1938' ;
Byers v. Byers, 222 N. C. 298. 22 S. E. 2d 902 (1942' ; Reynolds v. Reynolds. 208
N. C. 428, 181 S. E. 338 (1935) ; Same case 223 N. C. 85, 25 S. E. 2d 466 (1943).
Therefore it would seem that the judgment for divorce given the plaintiff would
show innocence on the part of the plaintiff and in some degree may imply mis-
conduct on the part of the defendant even in this type of divorce.
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law, or common law,43 offers no precedent for this result as the early
courts, in respect to the sacrament of marriage, were obliged to use
the legal fiction of voidance ab initio in order not to transgress a valid
marriage. 44  Consequently, if the ecclesiastical court had awarded ali-
mony incident to its divorce a vinculo the decree would have created a
duty to support without a valid marriage to serve as a basis. In North
Carolina the first issue to the jury in an absolute divorce proceeding is
the determination of a valid marriage.45 Accordingly, absolute divorce
under our law does dissolve a marriage and incident thereto does
destroy an existing duty to support, without substituting alimony.
40
The General Assembly recently revised the second proviso of G. S.
50-11 to read as follows: "... provided further, that except in the case
of divorce obtained with personal service on the wife, either within or
without the State, upon the grounds of the wife's adultery a decree of
absolute divorce shall not impair or 'destroy the right of the wife to
receive alimony and other rights provided for her under any judgment
or decree of a court rendered before the rendering of the judgment for
absolute divorce."'47  [Italics added.] This new provision has extended
the scope of the old provision so that the prior alimony award cannot
be destroyed by an absolute divorce on any ground, save the wife's
adultery. However, it is submitted that this is not a complete solution,
in that the statute still requires two separate judicial proceedings. If
the wife has a just claim to alimony and also a ground for absolute
divorce there does not appear to be any logical reason why she should
not be permitted to have both claims adjudicated in one proceeding. In
the case of Cameron v. Cameron"8 the court in recognizing the husband's
right to a cross demand for absolute divorce in his wife's pending action
for divorce a mensa with alimony49 said, ". . . . right and justice
require that an amendment be allowed which will enable the parties to
end the. . controversy in one and the same litigation. . .."50
As the 1953 change of G. S. 50-11 now requires the alimony decree
to be rendered prior to the rendering of the judgment for the absolute
divorce rather than prior to the commencement of the action for it, fact
situations like those in the Feldman and Livingston cases would ap-
parently still be decided the same way because the alimony awards in
" The ecclesiastical law, which has not been abrogated or modified by statute,
is now considered as part of the common law by our court. Medlin v. Medlin, 175
N. C. 529, 95 S. E. 857 (1918).
"' See note 10 supra.
" Long v. Long, 206 N. C. 706, 175 S. E. 85 (1934).
"See note 28 supra.
"Senate Bill No. 348 Ratified April 30, 1953.
48235 N. C. 82, 68 S. E. 2d 796 (1951).
" Cameron v. Cameron, 232 N. C. 686, 61 S. E. 2d 913 (1950), and 231 N. C.
123. 56 S. E. 2d 384 (1949).
"Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N. C. 82, 88, 68 S. E. 2d 796, 800 (1951) citing
Smith v. French, 141 N. C. 1, 53 S. E. 438 (1906).
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both cases were not rendered prior to, but at the same time as, the
rendering of the judgment for absolute divorce. However, if the
parties consent to a judgment for alimony and it is rendered prior to the
-dissolution of the marriage51 (even after the commencement of the suit
for absolute divorce) it seems clear that the alimony decree thus ob-
tained would be protected.
5 2
Within fifty judicial jurisdictions, including the forty-eight states, 53
the District of Columbia"4 and England55 only North Carolina and
Pennsylvania 6 have failed to provide a statutory basis for the allow-
ance of alimony incident to an absolute divorce. Most of the courts
in this overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have explained the pur-
pose of this legislation on the basis that it would be contrary to public
policy and against justice and equity to permit the guilty husband whose
wilful misconduct had brought about the dissolution of the marriage
to cast off the duty of support arising out of the marital status.
57
" Generally ".... a judgment by consent may be entered at the time specified
in the stipulation or agreement.. ." 49 C. J. S., Judgments § 176 at 313 (1947)
Osborn et. al. v. Rogers, 112 N. Y. 573, 20 N. E. 365 (1889).
" "Second: 'Can alimony against the husband be awarded when there is no
allegation, evidence or finding that he was the party at fault?' In an adversary
proceeding . . . 'No,' but where, as here, the parties acted in agreement and the
judgment was entered by consent, the answer is 'yes.' . . ." "Fourth: 'Can the
consent judgment in this case be enforced against plaintiff by attachment for
contempt?' Yes, it may be." Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 186, 187,
22 S. E. 2d 576, 580, 581 (1942).
"ALA. CODE tit. 34 § 31 (1940) ; Aaxz. CODE ANN. § 27-810 (1939) ; Aax.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (Supp. 1951); CAL. CIV. CODE § 139 (1949); COLD. STAT.
ANN. c. 56, § 8 (1935) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7335 (1949); DEL. REV. CODE c. 86,
§§ 3511, 3512 (1935), Brown v. Brown, 3 Terry 157, 29 A. 2d 149 (Del. 1942) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.08 (Supp. 1952); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (1952); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 32.706 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 40, § 19 (Supp. 1952) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3-1217 (Burns 1933); IOwA CODE ANN. c. 598, § 14 (1950); KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 60-1511 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.060 (1948); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:302 (1950), Russo v. Russo, 210 La. 853, 28 So. 2d 455 (1947); M. REv.
STAT. c. 153, § 62 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 16, § 15 (1951);
MASS. ANN. LAwS c. 208, § 34 (1933); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 25.103 (Supp.
1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.22 (West 1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2743
(1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §452.070 (Vernon 1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 21-139 (1947); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 42-318 (Supp. 1951); NEv. ComP. LAWS§ 9463 (Supp. 1949) ; N. H. Rav. LAWS c. 339 § 16 (1942) ; N. J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2:50-37 (Supp. 1951); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 25-706 (Supp. 1951) ; N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. Acr. § 1155 (Clevinger 1951); N. D. REV. CoDE § 14-0524 (1943); Onio
GEN. CODE ANN. §8003.17 (Supp. 1952); ONLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278(1937); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 9-914 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 416, § 5
(1938); S. C. CODE §20-113 (1952) ; S. D. CODE § 14.0726 (1939) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 8446 (Williams 1934); TFx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1925),
Keton v. Clark, 67 S. W. 2d 437 (Tex. 1933); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) ;
VT. REV. STAT. § 3244 (1947); VA. CODE § 20-107 (1950); WASH. Ray. CODE§ 26.08.110 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4715 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 247.26
(1951); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-5916 (1945).
" D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-411 (1951).
"HALS. STAT. ENG. Vol. II, c. 190 (2d ed. 1949) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 2 K. B.
572 (1951).
" Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super 507, 187 At. 245 (1936). (Except ali-
mony provision for the insane husband or wife).
IT Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898); Bialy v. Bialy, 167
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Thus in the light of historical background and legislation elsewhere,
it seems that the North Carolina legislation on the matter is inadequate
and stands almost alone. Our courts cannot deal fully with the prob-
lems of marital relations until the law permits the adjudication of both
the economic and personal relations of the parties; for neither the wife
nor society is served when she seeks her legal right to divorce at the
expense of being left destitute.58
Furthermore, there obviously is no legislative policy against allow-
ing alimony to continue after absolute divorce; for G. S. 50-11 does
preserve to the wife alimony acquired previous to the absolute divorce
decree. But this law compels her to pursue roundabout procedure, and
also results in technical pitfalls such as the one involved in the Feldman
case. It may also induce her to settle her economic future by consent
or contract without the impartial supervision of the court.
Therefore, as the court has intimated that the solution to this
complexity lies within the ambit of legislation rather than judicial de-
cision, 59 it is submitted that our statute should be revised so as to pro-
vide the courts with the discretionary power 0° to award alimony incident
to absolute divorce.
KENNETH A. GRIFFIN
Mich. 559, 133 N. W. 496 (1911); Swanson v. Siyanson 223 Minn. 354, 46
N. W. 2d 878 (1951) ; Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N. J. Eq. 545, 5 A. 2d 789 (1939)
cited in 27 C. J. S., Divorce § 229 (1941) and cases there cited; Hill v. Hill, 197
Okla. 697, 174 P. 2d 232 (1946) ; Warren v. Warre, 36 R. I. 167, 89 Atl. 651(1914); Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn. 619, 4 S. W. 2d 345 (1928); Stearns v.
Stearns, 66 Vt. 187, 28 Atl. 875 (1894).
" Darsie v. Darsie, 118 P. 2d 898, 900 (Cal. 1941) ("In its sovereign capacity
the state is interested not only in maintaining the marriage unless good cause for
its dissolution exists, but that there shall be a proper division of the community
property of the parties and provision for reasonable future support of the spouse
not at fault, so that the burden therefor shall rest on the husband, where it be-
longs, and not on the state.").
" "Whether further remedies are to be provided so that a man may be re-
quired to support his life after the marriage has been dissolved is for the General
Assembly to decide." Feldman v. Feldman, 236 N. C. 731, 734, 73 S. E. 2d 865,
868 (1952). See also Deaton v. Deato4 237 N. C. 487, 489, 490, - S. E. 2d -(1953), where the court in applying G. S. 50-11 ruled that an absolute divorce
obtained by either party on two years' separation did not destroy an alimony decree
rendered prior to the commencement of the divorce proceeding and said: "Whether
a statute .produces a just or an unjust result is a matter for legislators and not forjudges. We are nevertheless constrained to observe that justice does not neces-
sarily require that a faithless husband shall be relieved of all responsibility for the
support of an innocent wife who has spent her youth in his service merely
because the wife sees fit to put an end in law to a marriage long since ended
in fact by his broken vows."
' See 27 C. J. S., Divorce § 232 (1941) and cases there cited; See also Bialy
v. Bialy, 167 Mich. 559, 566, 133 N. W. 496, 499 (1911), where in discussing the
discretion tP be exercised, the court stated, "The Court should take into con-
sideration the past relations and conduct of both parties, the health and age of
each, whether or not either is responsible for the support of others, the amount
and source of the husband's property, their station in life and manner of living, and
especially, in view of all the testimony in the case, what sum will leave the
financial condition of the wife during her life not inferior to what it would be
if the husband's conduct bad been correct and the marriage undissolved."
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Federal Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-Apportionment
Death taxes are levied either on the privilege of transmitting or re-
ceiving property.1 The federal estate tax is of the former type 2 and is
imposed on the net estate of decedents3 "to the extent of the interest
of the decedent at the time of his death." The ultimate burden of the
tax may vary -depending upon (1) the jurisdiction administering the
estate, (2) the type of property involved, and (3) the presence or ab-
sence of direction of the burden by the testator or settlor.5 The burden
of the tax is a matter of state law6 and in the majority of common law
states the tax is payable from the residue of the estate7 unless a contrary
intention is shown by the decedent.8  An analysis of the cases requiring
payment of the tax from the residue of the estate shows the following
theories relied upon for the result: (1) the tax is levied on the whole
estate and not the individual shares, thus there is a presumption against
requiring individuals to contribute to the tax;9 (2) the Internal Rev-
' MONTGOmERY, FEDERAL TAXES 462 (1952).
2 INT. REV. CODE § 810, New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (1921).
'INT. REV. CODE § 810, Reg. 105 § 81.4.
'INT. REV. CODE § 811 (a), Reg. 105 §81.13
' All three factors are usually present in every case. The factors may further
be classified as follows: (1) "jurisdiction," (a) common law states, (b) equitable
apportionment states, (c) statutory apportionment states; (2) the "property," (a)
testamentary property, (b) intestate property and transfers of property included
in decedent's estate under certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, e.g.,
§ 811 (c) and (d); (3) this material does not contemplate covering the cases
on the specific language of testator necessary to direct the burden of taxes, but
only the result obtained in certain cases after the court has ruled on the meaning
of the words.
0 "We are of opinion that Congress intended the federal estate tax should be
paid out of the estate as a whole and that the applicable state law as to the devolu-
tion of property at death should govern the distribution of the remainder and the
ultimate impact of the federal tax ... " Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, 97
(1942).
"Considering the problem as an open question, we begin with the principle . . .
that the federal estate tax statute leaves it to the states to detrmine how the tax
burden shall be distributed among those who share in the taxed estate." In re
Heringer's Estate, 38 Wash. 2d 399, 403, 230 P. 2d 297, 300 (1951).
'Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N. E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U. S.
47 (1924) ; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P. 2d 469 (1924) ; Bemis
v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N. E. 686 (1923); Gelin v. Gelin, 296 Minn.
516, 40 N. W. 2d 342 (1949) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Wintrop, 238 N. Y.
477, 144 N. W. 686 (1924) ; Craig v. Craig, 232 N. C. 729, 62 S. E. 2d 336 (1951) :
Seattle-First National Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P. 2d 1078
(1949).
"The unfortunate nature of this situation was pointed out in 1930, by the New
York State Commission to Report Defects in the Law of Estates in the finding
that 'experience has demonstrated that in most estates, the residuary legatees are
the widow, children or nearer and more dependent relatives.'" Mitnick, State
Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 10 MD. L. REv. 289 (1949).
a "A careful reading of decedent's will fails to find any expression of decedent's
intention insofar as payment of federal estate tax is concerned." Gelin v. Gelin,
229 Minn. 516, 520, 40 N. W. 2d 342, 345 (1949). "In other jurisdictions, the
majority of courts have held that the federal estate tax burden is a charge against
and payable from the residue of an estate. . . ." Id. at 522, 40 N. W. 2d at 346.
' This argument is based on the nature of the tax and not on testator's silence
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enue Code requires the personal representative to pay the tax, therefore
it must be taken from the residuary estate in the same manner as debts
and expenses of administration ;'o and (3) "the courts can not speculate
concerning the intention of settlors and testators as to where they intend
the burden of taxes to rest."" Some states have enacted apportionment
statutes distributing the tax burden 1 2 and in two situations the Internal
Revenue Code allows the personal representative limited rights of re-
covery where there has been no direction as to payment of the tax.18
In 1948 Congress enacted a complicated marital deduction provision
in order to put non-community states on a substantial footing with those
states having community property rights.1 4  In substance, it allows a
deduction up to 50% of the adjusted gross estate for property passing to
the surviving spouse if certain requirements are fulfilled. 15
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 6 a case of first impression
in North Carolina, the widow dissented from decedent's will and elected
to take her statutory share." In an action by the executor for direction
as to the burden of the tax. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471,
124 N. E. 265 (1919).
Perhaps the leading decision on this point is Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47,
50 (1924) where the court held: "What was being imposed here was an excise
upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax upon
death of the owner. . . . What this law taxes is not the interest to which the
legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason
of the death."
" In Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471,
200 Atl. 786 (1938), the court held as the executor was required to pay the tax
before distribution, the tax was a charge against the estate, and like other debts
of administration, must he paid from the residue. Hughes v. Sun Life Assur.
Co. 159 F. 2d 110 (9th Cir. 1946); First Nat. Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50
N. E. 2d 461 (1943); Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N. W. 2d 342 (1949).
• Cf. Bigoness v. Anderson, 106 F. Supp. 986 (D. D. C. 1952), holding that
there was no reason to distinguish between the federal estate tax and debts of the
decedent and that if personalty in the residuary estate was not sufficient to pay the
tax then resort to the realty in the residuary estate could be made.
" Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 149 N. E. 686 (1923) (Testator was
silent on the subject of taxes.) For collection of cases involving testamentary
direction see Notes, 115 A. L. R. 916; 117 A. L. R. 1186; 15 A. L. R. 2d 1216.
"
2ARIC. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1947) ; CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 970-977 (Ann. 1944) ;
CONN. GErN STAT. §§ 2075-2081 (1949), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 227a (Supp. 1949),
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 449b (Supp. 1951); DEL. REV. CODE 1949 c. 405 (1935);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1952); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 65A, § 5 (Supp.
1952); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 81, § 160 (1951); NEB. REV. STAT.
§9 77-2108 through 77-2112 (1943, reissue 1950); N. H. Rev. LAWS c. 88-A, § 1
(as added by L. 1943 c. 75 and L. 1947 c. 102); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:26-45-
3:26-53 (Supp. 1951); N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 124; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20§ 881-887 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8350.7 (Williams, Supp. 1952);
TEx. RZEv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3883a. (1952) ; VA. CODE §§ 64-150-64-155 (1950).
3 INT. REV. CODE § 826 (c) (insurance proceeds) ; INT. Rev. CODE § 826 (d)(property over which decedent had a power of appointment).
'" INT. Rev. CODE § 812 (e), Reg. 105 § 81.47, 81A8.
"Id. " 236 N. C. 654, 73 S. E. 2d 879 (1953).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1943 Recomp. 1950) (time and manner of dissent);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1943, Recomp. 1950) "Upon such dissent the widow
shall have the same rights and estates in the real and personal property of her
husband as if he had died intestate."
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as to the allocation of the federal estate tax liability the court held that
the widow's one-half interest in the personalty of the estate 8 would be
computed after the payment of the federal estate tax. The decision re-
duced the share passing to the widow which lowered the marital de-
duction1" and resulted in a higher federal tax on the estate. However,
the decision in this particular case was not inequitable because had the
decision been otherwise the bequests to the principal beneficiaries would
have been wiped out. The court rejected the argument advanced con-
cerning the purpose of the marital deduction, 20 and held that pertinent
statutes 2' requiring distribution be made after the payment of debts.
The federal estate tax was held to come within the meaning of G. S.
§ 28-105 :22
"The debts of the decedent must be paid in the following
order:
"Fourth Class. Dues to the United States and to the State of
North Carolina. '23
The court relied on Craig v. Craig24 where it was held that the estate
tax was chargeable to the residuary estate thus indicating the tax
"should be regarded as a charge against the whole estate, to be paid
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149 (3) (1943, Recomp. 1950). The statute has re-
cently been amended, See note 27, infra. (Realty was not involved in the litiga-
tion).
10 INT. REv. CODE § 812 (e) (1) (E) (i). This section requires the marital de-
duction to be reduced by the amount of the tax payable on the interest of the
spouse. Thus, in the instant case had the tax been computed after the share was
allotted to the widow the reduction clause of the Code would not apply.
'0 "To place the property of married persons in common-law states on a more
nearly equal estate tax basis with the now reinstated "splitting" principle of
community property, the 1948 Act also amended the law to permit a married
person holding separate property to achieve substantially the same "splitting"
advantage, provided that he also accepted some of the community property dis-
advantages. This had been accomplished by the addition . . . of a "marital de-
duction" in computing the net estate subject to tax." MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
TAXES 784 (1952).
" "The statute now in force in this state prescribes that the dissenting widow
shall recive one-half the personal state . . . and directs the personal representative,
in case of intestacy, after payment of debts in the order prescribed by G. S. 28-105;
to distribute the surplus in the manner set out in G. S. § 28-149. The word
surplus means the personal property left after payment of the debts of the de-
ceased and costs of administration." Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236
N . C. 654, 659, 73 S. E. 2d 879, 8S3 (1953).
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-105 (1943, Recomp. 1950).
23 "It will be noted that there are no citations in the General Statutes under
this subsection. Governmental claims against the individual have much increased
both in number and complexity since this law was written, and it is difficult to
know just what the rule means. It would certainly seem to include upaid in-
come taxes, both state and federal, if such taxes are not included in class three.
It would also seem to include any other form of tax, assessment or penalty im-
posed by state or federal law which the United States or the State of North
Carolina could collect by legal process of any nature." DOUGLAS, ADDIINIS nTTRIO
OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 218 at p. 166 (1948).
2'232 N. C. 729, 62 S. E. 2d 336 (1950).
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from the residuary estate in the same manner as debts and expenses of
administration." 2-5 Thus, North Carolina followed the majority rule
by refusing to apportion taxes without legislative guidance. Subse-
quent tax legislation which would have nullified the effect of the instant
case failed.
2 6
However, an amendment to the North Carolina distribution statute2 7
has been enacted which will allow the dissenting widow her statutory
share in personal property free of the federal estate tax in a situation
comparable to the facts of the Green case.
The distribution provision before the recent amendment provided 28
that if a man died intestate leaving a wife but no children the widow
would get all of the personal property up to $10,000 with the remainder
distributed one-half to the widow and one-half to the decedent's next of
kin who are in equal degree of kinship, or their legal representative.
In case the decedent died testate, and the widow dissented from the will,
she would take one-half the personal estate and the remainder would
be distributed according to the terms of the will.
Chapter 1325 (amendment to G. S. § 28-149 (3)) does not change
the basic distributions of personalty in form, but far different monetary
results may be obtained because of the addition of provisions relating
to the federal estate tax.
Chapter 1325 provides that in the situation where the widow is to
receive one-half the estate of the intestate which exceeds $10,000, the
one-half will be computed before any deduction for the federal tax. The
iemaining one-half which goes to the husband's next of kin is subject to
the federal tax. Apparently the $10,000 to be allotted the widow in this
situation (where the estate exceeds $10,000) is subject to the federal
tax for it is not expressly exempted. However, it would seem that be-
cause the share allotted to the next of kin is expressly made subject
to the federal tax that the $10,000 to the widow is exempt from the
tax in the same manner as her one-half share in the estate which exceeds
$10,000. If the husband dies testate and the widow dissents from the
will her one-half share in the personalty is exempt from the tax. The
remaining one-half which is 'distributed according to the decedent's will
bears the burden of the federal estate tax. Chapter 1325 further pro-
vides that nothing in the act will be construed to deprive a widow of
her right to a year's support.
" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N. C. 654, 662, 72 S. E. 2d 879,
885 (1953). In Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 556, 101 N. E. 2d
604 (1951) the distribution statute provided that the dissenting spouse would be
entitled to a certain share "after the payment of all just claims." The federal
estate tax was held to be a "just claim" and the widow received her share after
deduction for the estate tax as in the principal case.
O S. B. 357, N. C. General Assembly 1953. Reported unfavorably April, 1953.
" H. B. 851, c. 1325 N. C. General Assembly 1953.
"N. C. Gen. Stat. § 28-149 (3) (1943, Recomp. 1950).
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Ohio, in Miller v. Hanmnond,29 reached a decision contra to the
principal case on similar facts. The dissenting widow was allowed her
statutory share free of the federal tax. The Ohio statutes involved are
comparable to those of North Carolina30 (but before c. 1325 was en-
acted in North Carolina). The Ohio court had to distinguish the
often-quoted decision of Y.M.C.A. v. Davis,3 ' where residuary charitable
institutions were burdened with the federal estate tax notwithstanding
the federal charitable deduction provisions. The court held that
Y.M.C.A. v. Davis was 'decided before the federal marital deduction
provision and it involved testamentary property whereas the Miller
case involved the dissenting share of a widow, i.e., intestate property.
This decision was followed by McDougall v. Central National Bank32
where the court apportioned the tax between an intestate estate and an
inter vivos trust. However, in Vandervort v. Hodge,33 where the estate
consisted entirely of testate property, any trend toward a full apportion-
ment rule in Ohio was reversed and the residuary estate was charged
with the full burden of the federal estate tax. The court reiterated the
doctrine of Y.M.C.A. v. Davis and held it had been approved and dis-
distinguished in the Miller and McDougall cases.
Kentucky has long recognized the equitable rule of apportionment
where non-probate property was involved3 4 and recently allowed the dis-
senting spouse to take her share tax free35 on the premise that equitable
apportionment is within the inherent power of the courts. The court
reasoned that the marital deduction was enacted to equalize tax rights
between community and non-community property states, and as the
spouse's share would not add to the tax by virtue of the marital de-
duction she would not be liable for payment of any of the tax. Rhode
Island has apportioned the tax between testamentary and non-testa-
mentary property. In Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlog0 this court re-
quired contribution from six inter-vivos trusts where testator had di-
rected that taxes be paid from the residuary estate but neglected to
mention "any taxes which might be imposed by reason of the inter-vivos
"156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N. E. 2d 9 (1952).
OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 10509-121 (Supp. 1951).
"See note 7 mtpra.
32 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N. E. 2d 441 (1952). The theory of this case seemed
to be that there was a "common obligation" resting on the intestate estate and the
trust property to pay the estate tax, thus, it was apportioned between the two types
of property. Query as to whether there is any more of a common obligation in
this situation than there is in a case involving only probate assets, or the dissenting
share of a spouse.
" CCH INH. EsT. & GIFr TAx REP. 17,706 (1950), Ohio Ct. App. (1st.
App. D. 1953).
" Hamptons Admr. v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S. W. 496 (1920) ; Martin
v. Martin's Admr., 283 Ky. 513, 142 S. W. 2d 164 (1940) ; Trimble v. Hatcher's
Ex'rs., 295 Ky. 178, 173 S. W. 2d 985 (1943).
Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S. W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1951).
"77 R. I. 428, 76 A. 2d 600 (1951).
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gifts in question. '3 - Georgia38 and Louisiana3 9 have applied the equi-
table rule and recently Indiana joined the ranks of the minority with a
strong denunciation of the common law rule. The latter court in Pearcy
v. The Citizens Bank and Trust Co.40 said:
We believe the cases from the states holding against the
right of apportionment except where there is specific statutory
authority therefore, or a specific provision therefor, in the will of
the decedent, are based upon an erroneous concept of the Federal
Estate Tax Act and a misinterpretation of provisions thereof.
The court applied the apportionment rule to survivorship property.
The apportionment rule has merit especially where intestate shares
or non-testamentary property, such as inter-vivos trusts, gifts, and
survivorship rights are involved because of the weakness of the residue
argument in situations such as these. It is well settled that the ultimate
burden of the tax is a matter of state law, thus, why is it necessary to
hold that because the federal estate tax is a charge on the whole estate,
the tax is in the position of debts of the estate and accordingly its pay-
ment falls on the residuary estate? It would seem that the non-testa-
mentary estate could be distinguished from the testamentary estate of
the decedent and be made to bear its own burden of the tax, if any.
"7 The testator's meaning was held to be a matter of conjecture. Two previ-
ous Rhode Island cases apportioning the federal estate tax were relied on by the
court. Trust Co. v. Watson, 76 R. I. 223, 68 A. 2d 916 (1949) (insurance pro-
ceeds) ; Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R. 1. 290, 33 A. 2d 206 (1942) (property passing
under power of appointment). Contribution in both cases were allowed pursuant
to the provisions of the Int. Rev. Code, note 13 supra. However, in the In-
dustrial Trust Co. case the court reasoned there was no distinction between prop-
erty passing under a power of appointment and property which a decedent had
placed in trust. Both types were out of a decedent's control, and neither type of
property constitutes part of a decedent's true estate. The Rhode Island court was
not deterred by the fact that the state did not have an apportionment statute.
The Rhode Island court did not invoke the doctrine of "implied direction," i.e.,
allowing contribution from the trust property because the testator did not mention
it in his direction, but held the distinguishing factor was between testamentary
and non-testamentary property. See Note, 31 B. U. L. REv. 233, 235 (1951).
"s Regents of University System of Georgia v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 194 Ga.
255, 21 S. E. 2d 691 (1942). The federal estate tax was apportioned between
the individual estate of testatrix and property passing under power of appoint-
ment notwithstanding a statute which provided the tax would be a charge against
the estate and not against the individual shares. The court held the property
passing under the appointment was separate and distinct from the donee's own estate
thus both classes of property should bear the burden of the tax. Section 826 (d)
of the Code was not in effect at the decedent's death, thus, the court had to rely
solely on its equitable powers to apportion the tax.
" Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So. 2d 114 (1947) (survivor-
ship property). ". . . equitable principles demand that the burden be divided
between all persons sharing in the estate in accordance with their respective in-
terests." Id.. 33 So. 2d at 117.
4 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N. E. 2d 918 (1951). In this case the court relied on
equitable apportionment for survivorship property but required contribution from




This reasoning is even stronger in a situation where decedent has di-
rected the burden of the tax on the residuary without mentioning inter-
vivos transfers or survivorship property.
Those jurisdictions having apportionment statutes 41 reach all of the
assets by typically providing that the tax will be apportioned among
those interested in the estate4 2 but those interests will be allowed any
deductions granted under the act imposing the tax.43 The latter phrase
allows the parties who qualify to take the deductions offered in the
Internal Revenue Code.44  However, apportionment states are faced
with a conflict between their proration laws and their distribution
statutes as to the method of computation of the share. The widow's
share has been computed tax free4 5 notwithstanding a distribution
statute declaring her interest to share ratably in the tax, because the
apportionment act indicated a legislative policy not to tax any interest
that did not add to the tax burden. The same result has been reached
on the theory that the distribution statute did not provide a method of
computation of the widow's share but only set an upper limit to which
the taker was entitled.46
Connecticut allowed the widow's share to pass tax free despite a di-
rection by testator to the executor "to pay ... all my just and lawful
debts, funeral and testamentary expenses. '47  The words did not cover
the payment of federal estate taxes, said the court, and if the marital
deduction was not allowed it would substantially increase the tax. In
Estate of Dontald Bayne,4s testator gave one-half of the residuary estate
in trust to his wife for life, and created two trusts of one-fourth each
from the other half. Testator directed "all ... taxes which may accrue
hereunder ... be paid out of my general estate." It was held that the
' See note 12 mtpra.
'
2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (Ann. 1944) ("shall be equitably prorated among
persons interested in the estate to whom such property is or may be transferred or
to whom any benefit accrues.")
" CAL. PROB. CODE (Ann. 1944) ("In making a proration allowances shall
be made for any exemptions granted by the act imposing the tax and for any de-
ductions allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the net
estate.")
"INT. RE v. CODE § 812.
"In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
It re Peter's Will, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 651 (1949), affd. 89 N. Y. S. 2d 651
(1949) ; Estate of Frank Wolf, CCH INH. EsT. & Grvr TAx REP. 17,705 (1950),
N. Y. Surr. Ct, N. Y. Co. (1953). The "upper limit" doctrine originated in In
re Goldsmith's Estate, 177 Misc. 298, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (1941) where the court
distinguished between the words "intestate share" and "share in intestacy." The
New York distribution statute limited the "intestate share" to no more than one-
half the net estate of decedent. The court held that this was a "term of art"
setting an upper limit to the "share in intestacy" but not providing a method of
computation of the "share in intestacy."
"'Jerome v. Jerome, CCH INH. EsT. & GiFT TAX REP. 1 17,666 (1950),
Conn. Sun. Ct. Err. (1952).
" CCH INH. EsT. & GiFT TAX REP. 17,321 (1950), N. Y. Surr. Ct., Westch.
Co. (1950).
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words "general estate" were equivalent to "residuary estate" and
amounted to an implied direction against apportionment but there was
no direction for or against apportionment of such taxes imposed on the
residuary gifts within the respective shares comprising the residuary
estate.
The foregoing material has pointed up some of the highly technical
difficulties encountered in arriving at an individual's estate tax burden.
The trend is towards equitable apportionment and some states have
bills in the current legislative sessions to provide for statutory appor-
tionment.49  In the principal case, North Carolina seems to have de-
cided to stay inexorably with the common law view of pressing the
entire estate tax burden on the residuary estate. The court distinguished
a Kentucky case as applying an equitable apportionment rule5" which
indicates it will not adopt any. The recent amendment to the North
Carolina distribution statute, c. 1325, will allow the widow a full marital
deduction where there are no children, but it is submitted that a com-
plete apportionment statute would be more equitable and it would give
monetary relief to those unlucky enough to "reside in the residue."
JACK D. YARBROUGH.
Landlord and Tenant-Leases-Rights of Lessees under Oral Leases
In decisions growing out of a recent litigation, involving three ap-
peals,1 the Supreme Court has clarified considerably the North Carolina
position on some of the rights of oral lessees, but at the same time has
cast some doubt as to other rights under such oral leases.
2
The litigation involved a situation wherein the plaintiff had, by oral
agreement, leased two tobacco warehouses for three tobacco marketing
'o Arizona-H. 45. Amends estate tax code to conform to federal provisions
governing marital deduction. (Approved, March 13, 1953).
Connecticut-S. 203. Provides a more equitable apportionment of the federal
estate tax within a fund consisting of the proceeds of life insurance. (Conn. has
an apportionment statute, see note 12, supra).
Iowa-S. 345. Provides for equitable apportionment of estate tax among
those interested in the estate.
Nebraska-LB. 578. Provides that the interest of any surviving spouse shall
be determined prior to the payment of any federal estate tax or state inheritance
tax. (Neb. has an apportionment statute. See note 12, supra).
Tennessee-S. 597. Permits marital deduction on inheritance tax. (Tenn. has
an apportionment statute. See note 12, supra).
Vermont-H. 509. Relates to apportionment of federal estate tax in certain
cases.
West Virginia-H. 24. Relates to the apportionment of death taxes among
persons interested in the estate of decedent. CCH INH. EsT. & Ginr TAx REp.
(1950), 1953 Pending Legislation, 186,501, 509.
"' Note 35 supra.
IPerkins v. Langdon, 231 N. C. 386, 57 S. E. 2d 407 (1950); Perkins v.
Langdon, 233 N. C. 240, 63 S. E. 2d 565 (1951) ; Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C.
159. 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953).1 It will be the object of this note to point up both results.
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seasons. While the plaintiff was out of possession at the end of the first
season, the lessor conveyed the property to a third party, and the
plaintiff brought suit against the lessor for damages.3
After two appeals of the case to the Supreme Court on procedural
matters, 4 in the trial on the merits, the jury found the facts as alleged
in the amended complaint to the effect that the defendant-lessor had,
while the plaintiff-lessees were out of possession, conveyed the orally
leased property to good faith purchasers for value and without notice
in violation of an agreement that "during said term, the defendant would
retain ownership ... and not sell the same."5 The trial court rendered
judgment for damages accordingly and the Supreme Court affirmed
on appeal, primarily on the basis of the express covenant not to sell.6
The Court further held that even though the purchasers had knowledge
of the existence of a lease on the property, they were none the less
justified in relying on representations by the vendor that the outstanding
lease was terminable on sale of the reversion at the end of one year.7
In reaching its conclusions, the court reaffirmed its position8 and
clearly aligned itself with the almost universal rule that a landowner
can sell the reversionary interest in the land, subject to a lease, in the
' Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953).
'On the first appeal in 231 N. C. 386, 57 S. E. 2d 407 (1950), upon demurrer
ore tenus in the Supreme Court, the court held that mere allegations that the
lessor had sold the premises during the term of the lease and that the lessees bad
been damaged as a result thereof, failed to state a cause of action, and remanded
with leave to amend. In so holding the court said, "The gravaman of plaintiffs'
cause of action is the sale of the leased warehouses before the expiration of the
lease. But the weakness of the plaintiffs' position lies in the fact that the lease
contains no stipulation against a sale of the leased properties during its exist-
ence. . ." Id. at 389, 390, 57 S. E. 2d at 409, 410.
Thereupon the complaint was amended to allege an agreement that the de-
fendant covenaated not to sell for the term of the lease, and that while the plain-
tiffs were not in possession, the defendants conveyed to persons who purchased
for value, in good faith and without notice. Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N. C. 240,
241, 63 S. E. 2d 565, 567 (1951). The case was again appealed by the defendant
upon denial of motion to strike; whereupon the Court modified and affirmed.
Perkins v. Landon, 233 N. C. 240, 63 S. E. 2d 565 (1951).
'Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N. C. 240, 241, 63 S. E. 2d 565, 567 (1951).
'Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (195 ).
"... the question here presented is . . . whether, acting as ordinary prudent
persons would have done, the purchasers were called upon, under the circum-
stances, to make inquiry of the lessees." Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 169,
74 S. E. 2d 634, 642 (1953).
As to whether reliance of the grantee on statements made by the grantor in
reference to reports regarding his title may or may not be relied on, the majority
of the courts, as does North Carolina in this case, hold that justifiable reliance
depends on the circumstances of the case. U. S. v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321 (1906); Chicago v. Witt, 75 Ill. 211 (1874); Skeel v. Spraker,
8 Paige 182 (N. Y. 1840) ; Ohio River Junction R R. v. Pennsylvania Co., 222
Pa. 573, 72 Atl. 271 (1909). Cf. Note, 38 L.R.A. (N.s.) 307 (1912).
'Perkins v. Langdon, 231 N. C. 386, 57 S. E. 2d 407 (1950); Wilcoxon v.
Donelly, 90 N. C. 245 (1884) ; Bullard v. Johnson, 65 N. C. 436 (1871) ; Korne-
gay v. Collier, 65 N. C. 69 (1871) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-2, 8 (1943, recompiled
1950); 1 MoRnDcAs's LAW LEcruRms, 2d Ed., pp. 596, 597 (1916).
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absence of a covenant to the contrary,9 and that the tenant cannot
resist the transfer or ground a cause of action on the transfer or re-
sultant change of landlords. 10 It is further recognized, both in North
Carolina and elsewhere, that a bona fide purchaser without notice of
outstanding equities in the land, as in the case of a leasehold right, takes
title free from such encumbrances. 1 This gives rise to the question
of what constitutes notice to purchasers in North Carolina.
In the case of written leases, capable of registration, the answer
is clear, inasmuch as under our Registration Act,12 notice arises from
registration only,' 3 and even actual notice will not suffice in the absence
' Garetson v. Hester, 57 Cal. App. 2d 39, 133 P. 2d 863 (1943); Achtar v.
Posner, 56 A. 2d 797 (Md. 1948); Curry v. Engle, 91 N. E. 2d 41 (Ohio App.
1949) ; Brown v. Brown, 164 Pa. Super. 350, 64 A. 2d 506 (1949) ; Peterman v.
Kingsley, 140 Wis. 666, 123 N. W. 137 (1909); 2 McADAMs, LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 233 (5th Ed., Ambert, 1934); 3 THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1380(Perm. Ed. 1940); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 146 (3rd Ed. 1910);
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 3.59, 4.67 (1952) and cases cited therein;
51 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant, § 258(a), p. 895 (1947) and cases cited therein.
"0 Garetson v. Hester, 57 Cal. App. 2d 39, 133 P. 2d 863 (1943) ; Peterman v.
Kingsley, 140 Wis. 666, 123 N. W. 137 (1909). Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C.
159, 164, 74 S. E. 2d 634, 639 (1953) ("This is so because such transfer of the
reversion, subject to the lease, neither terminates the leasehold estate nor deprives
the tenant of any of his rights to land."). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 42-8 (1943, re-
compiled 1950) ("The grantee in every conveyance of reversion in lands . . . has
the like advantages and remedies . . . as the grantor or lessor or his heirs mighthave; and the holders of such estates . . . have the like advantages and remedies
against the grantee of the reversion. ").
See also, as to the general proposition that the lessee loses no rights by transfer
of the reversion, Miller v. Compton, 185 S. W. 2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945).
" Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 2d 528 (1948); Lynch v.Johnson, 171 N. C. 611, 89 S. E. 61 (1916) (dissent) ; Beeson v. Smith, 149 NX. C.
142, 62 S. E. 879 (1908) ; Derr v. Dellinger, 75 N. C. 300 (1876) ; Winborn v.
Gorrell, 38 N. C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 117 (1843) ("It is only the purchaser of the legal
title without notice of a prior equity who can hold against . . . notice.") ; Polk
v. Gallant, 22 N. C. 395 (1839) ; Smith v. U. S., 153 F. 2d 655 (5th Cir. 1946) ;
Clemens v. Fuller, 209 Ark. 849, 192 S. W. 2d 762 (1946) ; Prince Surf Hotel v.
McLendon, 74 Ga. App. 805, 41 S. E. 2d 556 (1947) ; Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis,
201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100 (1946) ; Eckman v. Buhl, 116 N. J. 308, 184 Atl.
430 (1936) ; Raisin v. Shoemaker, 200 N. Y. Supp. 615, 206 App. Div. 122, aff'd.
238 N. Y. 603, 144 N. E. 921 (1923); Wade v. Burkhart, 196 Okla. 615, 167
P. 2d 357 (1946); American Refining Co. v. Bank, 356 Pa. 226, 51 A. 2d 719(1947). See also, 1 MCADAAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 112 (5th Ed., Ambert,
1934); 2 Po~MoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 688 (5th Ed., Symons, 1941); 3
PonmERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 753 (5th Ed., Symons, 1941); 1 AMERicAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.59 (1952). But cf., Toupin v. Peabody, 162 Mass.
495. 39 N. E. 280 (1895) ; Bramhall v. Hutchinson, 42 N. J. Eq. 372, 7 Atl. 873(1886) ; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 110 p. 175 (3rd Ed., Jones, 1939) ("If,
on the other hand, the lease is not within the recording laws, the grantee, al-
though a purchaser for value and without notice thereof, will, it seems, take
subject thereto.")
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1943, recompiled 1950), reading in part: "No con-
veyance of land, or contract to convey, or lease for more than three ears shall
be valid to pass any property, as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable
consideration, from the donor, bargainor or lessor, but from the registration there-
of .1. ." [emphasis added1.
Spence v. Pottery Co., 185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 494 (1925).
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of such. 14 But in the case of oral leases for terms not exceeding three
years, the question is not so simple. Such oral leases are, by necessary
implication, excepted from the Statute of Frauds ;15 nor are they re-
quired to be registered under the North Carolina Registration Act.18
Furthermore, it has been held that the record of an instrument of a
class not authorized or required by law to be recorded, such as an oral
lease for less than three years, does not constitute notice.17
North Carolina does, however, subscribe to the general, if not uni-
versal principle,' 8 that possession under equities not required to be
registered constitutes notice to purchasers.19 The notice conveyed by
such possession is of whatever claim the possessor asserts, 20 or which
could have been ascertained by reasonable inquiry.21 Further, it has
been held that any information, reasonably calculated to stimulate in-
quiry,22 constitutes notice of the possessors' claims whether or not the
1" Eller v. Arnold, 230 N. C. 418, 53 S. E. 2d 266 (1949) ; Chandler v. Cameron,
229 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 2d 528 (1948) ; State Trust Co. v. Braznell, 227 N. C. 211,
41 S. E. 2d 744 (1947).
"N . C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1943), reading in part: "All contracts to sell or
convey any lands ... and all other leases and contracts for leasing lands exceeding
it duration three years from the making thereof, shall be void unless said contract
or some memorandum thereof, be put in writing. ... [Emphasis added.]10 N . C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1943, recompiled 1950). The section, by implica-
tion of terms, applies only to those instruments capable of registration which in-
cludes only those instruments required by the Statute of Frauds (N. C. GEN. STAT.§ 22-2 (1943)) to be in writing. E.g., Sansom v. Warren, 215 N. C. 432, 2 S. E.
2d 459 (1939) ; Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C. 14, 128 S. E. 32 (1932) (discussion of
question per Stacy, J.) ; Prichard v. Williams, 175 N. C. 319, 97 S. E. 570 (1918)
(But see dissent by Clark, C. J.); Wood v. Tinsley, 138 N. C. 507, 51 S. E. 59(1905) ; Boyd, Some Phases of Title Examination and Real Estate Practice, 20
N. C. L. Rav. 168, 193 (1941-42).
"' Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 2d 528 (1948). Thus it can be
seen that the law as it stood prior to the Connor Act (N. C. GEaN. STAT. § 47-18(1943, recompiled 1950)), and where the Connor Act is not applicable, must be
looked to as controlling. Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 165, 74 S. E. 2d
634. 640 (1953).
18 For general text discussions and citation of cases from without North
Carolina, concerrng possession and implied notice, see 1 MERRILL, NoTIcE, §§ 102,
103 (1952); 4 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 17.11 (1952); 66 C. J. S., Notice,
§ 11 (1950).
1. Bost v. Setzer, 87 N. C. 187 (1882); Tankard v. Tankard, 79 N. C. 54(1878). Possession to constitute notice must be open, notorious and exclusive
and presently existing. Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 67 S. E. 41 (1910) ; Mayo
v. Leggett, 96 N. C. 237, 1 S. E. 622 (1887) ; Johnson v. Hauser, 88 N. C. 388(1883) ; Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. C. 177 (1874) ; Webber v. Taylor, 55 N. C.
(2.j.ones Eq.) 9 (1854).
" Avent v. Arrington, 105 N. C. 377, 10 S. E. 991 (1890) ; Heyer v. Beatty,
83 N. C. 285 (1880).
" Tankard v. Tankard, 79 N. C. 54 (1878) ; Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. C.
177 (1874) (though the purchaser does not know or have any means of knowing
the interest).22 Blankeship v. English, 222 N. C. 91, 21 S. E. 2d 891 (1942): Austin v.
George. 201 N. C. 380. 160 S. E. 364 (1931); Truitt v. Grandy, 115 N. C. 54,
20 S. E. 293 (18.94) (the circumstances must be such as to impose a duty on
the person sought to be charged with a duty to make inquiry) ; Loan Association
v. Merritt, 112 N. C. 243, 17 S. E. 296 (1893) ; Ijames v. Gaither, 93 N. C. 358
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purchaser in fact makes an inquiry.2 3
Just what information will be held sufficient to stimulate inquiry
such as will constitute notice is a question on which the decisions are
.not very illuminating. However, it has been held that, while informa-
tion demanding inquiry must be definite,2 4 it is sufficient if it is such as
men ordinarily act upon,25 and comes from a reliable source.20  Thus,
it has been held that newspaper reports actually read are a source of
information that imposes a duty of inquiry.2 7  But in a situation, such
as the principal case, would the name of the lessees, denominated as
such, painted on the building or printed on a card, prominently dis-
played on the building, constitute notice from inquiry inducement ?28
The logic of protecting the bona fide purchaser without possession-
or-inquiry notice is inescapable; otherwise, every purchaser of realty
would buy with the possibility that he takes subject to an oral lease,
and no amount of inquiry would protect him as a matter of law against
such hidden equities.2 9  But from the point of view of the lessee out of
possession, the rule may be harsh, unless he is entitled to an action at
law for damages against the lessor for the loss of his estate in the lease-
hold.a 0
Although no prior North Carolina case has been found so holding,
it is generally accepted in jurisdictions where the question has arisen
(1885) (where party has information reasonably calculated to excite attention
and stimulate inquiry, he is charged with constructive notice of all that reasonable
inquiry would have disclosed, the theory being that knowledge which one ought
to have is imputed to him); Blackwood v. Jones, 57 N. C. (4 Jones Eq.) 54
(1858).23 Ijames v. Gaither, 93 N. C. 358 (1885).
"Republic Steel Corp. v. Willis, 243 Ala. 127, 9 So. 2d 297 (1942) ; Goddard
Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S. W. 2d 759 (Mo. App. 1939); Evans v. Century
Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 273, 22 S. E. 2d 877 (1942).
22 Curtis v. Mundy, 44 Mass. 405 (1841).
-6 Person v. Daniel, 22 N. C. 360 (1833) (neighbor); Kenniff v. Caulfield,
140 Cal. 34, 73 Pac. 803 (1903) (responsible third party) ; Johns v. Gilliam, 134
Fla. 575, 184 So. 140 (1938) (tax collector) ; Huges v. Williams, 218 Mass. 448,
105 N. E. 1056 (1914) (lawyer) ; St. Helen Shooting Club v. Barber, 150 Mich.
571, 114 N. W. 399 (1908).27Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U. S. 1 (1924).
The question has apparently not been answered, though in one case, it has been
that the name and address of the equitable owner, on a "for sale" sign on a
vacant lot was not such possession as to constitute notice. Ballona v. Petex, 234
Mich. 273, 207 N. W. 836 (1926).
29 Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159. 166, 74 S. E. 2d 634, 640 (1953).
'o A number of cases have so held. Williams v. Young, 78 N. J. Eq. 293, 81
AtI. 1118, 1119 (1910) (the court on facts closely analogous to the principal case,
said: "When defendant wrongfully conveyed the land in question to an innocent
purchaser for value without notice of complainant's leasehold estate, the leasehold
estate in the land was necessarily destroyed . . . The conveyance to the innocent
purchaser was, in effect, a conveyance of the term and the reversion. Com-
plainant thereby became entitled to recover from defendant in an action at
law.... .") ; Raisin v. Shoemaker, 200 N. Y. Supp. 615, 206 App. Div. 122, aff'd.




that a sale of the reversion to a bona fide purchaser which cuts off the
lease rights of a lessee out of possession constitutes a wrong to the
lessee for which he may have redress against his lessor,31 on the theory
of breach of express or implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.32 This
was one of the theories upon which the action in the principal case was
brought.33  However, by implication from the principal litigation, the
North Carolina Court may be departing from this view, to the extent
that such redress may not be had on the ground of breach of implied,
as distinguished from express, covenant of quiet enjoyment. In the
first appeal, the cause was remanded for further pleadings as to whether
or not there was an express covenant not to sell for the period of the
lease,34 and it was the express covenant so found upon which the de-
cision in the third appeal was predicated.3 5 Consequently, notwithstand-
ing the fact that further allegations and proof on the question of whether
the purchaser took bona fide and without notice were also necessary, the
principal litigation would seem, nevertheless, to imply a necessity of an
express covenant in order to ground such an action. This in turn, may
well indicate a restriction on North Carolina's implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment in leases of realty. 6
In view of the finding that the lease contained such an express cove-
"Actually, the theory on which the lessee is allowed to recover in many of the
cases seems difficult of ascertainment, although the courts seldom refuse to grant
relief. 3 Mo. L. Rrv. 299 (1938).
At lease three theories are possible on which to predicate an action for
destruction of the leasehold estate: implied covenant to pay to lessee money had
and received to his use, such amount as was received for the term; breach of
engagement in the lease (covenant of quiet enjoyment) ; and in tort for wrongful
destruction of the term. Williams y. Young, 78 N. J. Eq. 293, 81 Atl. 1118
(1910).
"In the usual case, however, the lessee seeks relief upon the ground that the
lessor's conduct amounts to a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment."
1 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERr Y, § 3.50, p. 277 (1952).
"By the weight of authority, including North Carolina, the ordinary lease
raises an implied covenant that the lessee shall have the quiet enjoyment and
peaceful possession of the premises, as regards the lessor or anyone claiming
through or under him or anyone asserting paramount title. Brewington v.
Loughran, 183 N. C. 558, 112 S. E. 257 (1922); Improvement Co. v. Coley-
Bardin, 156 N. C. 256, 72 S. E. 312 (1911) ; Huggins v. Waters, 154 N. C. 443,
70 S. E. 842 (1911) ; Conrad v. Morehead, 89 N. C. 31 (1883); McKesson v.
Mendenhall, 64 N. C. 502 (1870) [But cf. Barneycastle v. Walker, 92 N. C. 198
(1885)]; Gulf Refining Co. v. Fetscham, 130 F. 2d 129 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U. S. 764 (1943); Rulf v. Von Schoeler, 52 So. 2d 82 (La. App.
1951); Carpet Co. v. Fletcher, 315 Mass. 350, 52 N. E. 2d 681 (1943);
Manufacturing Co. v. Buntin, 27 Tenn. App. 411, 181 S. W. 2d 634 (1944);
L-M-S, Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S. W. 2d 286 (1950); Sandall v.
Haskins, 104 Utah 50, 137 P. 2d 819 (1943); 1 AmFucAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§ 3.47, n. 4 (1952).
"Brief for Appellees, p. 15, Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d
634 (1953).
"' Perkins v. Langdon, 231 N. C. 386, 389, 57 S. E. 2d 407, 409 (1950).
"Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 166, 74 S. E. 2d 634, 641 (1953).
" See note 31, sitpra.
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nant, the decision is foregone, and the liability of the lessor is clear, but
Quaere: what result if no such covenant had been found?
In view of the implications of the present decision requiring a
breach of express covenant to render the landlord liable for destruction
of the leasehold right by sale to a bona fide purchaser, the difficulty
of giving constructive notice when continued possession is impossible
or contrary to the actual terms of the lease, it would seem that legis-
lation is necessary to better protect the rights of the lessee. It is sub-
mitted that such protection could be adequately afforded by: (1)
amending the Statute of Frauds37 to require all leases of whatever
duration to be evidenced by some writing; and (2) requiring all leases
of whatever duration to be registered under our Registration Act.88
Such registration would constitute constructive notice 9 to all pur-
chasers of the reversion that there is an equity outstanding in the
land,40 and would thereby protect present lessees from loss of their
estate without redress by the lessor's sale of it to a bona fide purchaser
without notice of such interests.4 1
THOMAS L. YOUNG
Mortgages-Mortgages to Secure Future Advances
In the absence of a statute providing otherwise,' the validity of a
mortgage or deed of trust to secure future advances is fully recognized
today.2 The common law sanctioned this type of mortgage as a useful
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1943).
3"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1943, recompiled 1950).
" Spence v. Pottery Co., 185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 494 (1925).
" The requirement that all leases be registered would not be harsh, in view
of the high literacy rate in our population. today, and would have the positive
effect of making land titles more certain, and would obviate the necessity of in-
specting the property as to possession since registration alone would constitute
notice of equitable claims in the form of leases outstanding.
"1 It should be noted that a somewhat analogous problem has been resolved
by the courts without the aid of legislation, where the record owner of land, title
to which has been perfected in another by adverse possession, conveys when the
owner by adverse possession is out of the land. The courts, while recognizing
the impossibility of recordation of titles by adverse possession, generally hold
that adverse title, once obtained is good even as against bona fide purchasers
without notice.
The North Carolina Court has, in at least one case, aligned itself with this
position. Morse v. Freeman, 157 N. C. 385, 72 S. E. 1056 (1911). But cf., Ricks
v. Batchelor, 225 N. C. 8, 33 S. E. 2d 68 (1945). For cases to the same effect
from other jurisdictions, see, Note, 9 A. L. R. 2d 850 (1950).
1 "No estate conveyed in mortgage shall be holden by the mortgagee for the
payment of any sum of money or the performance of any other thing the obliga-
tion or liability to the payment or performance of which arises, is made or con-
tracted after the execution and delivery of the mortgage, except as herein pro-
vided." N. H. Rrv. LAws c. 261, § 3 (1942).
'Lawrence v. Tucker, 23 How. 14 (U. S. 1859) ; Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa
498, 210 N. W. 559 (1926) ; Toulbee v. First Nat. Bank of Jackson, 279 Ky. 153,
130 S. W. 2d 48 (1939) ; Hortman-Salmon Co. v. White, 169 La. 1057, 123 So.
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method of providing for continuous dealings and security for obliga-
tions to arise at future times. Such have been thought particularly
desirable, for example, in construction loans where advances are made
as the work progresses. 3 They have been used as indemnities for
prospective indorsements, guaranties and accommodations of commercial
paper to be made by the mortgagee, and in maintaining lines of credit
with the mortgagee.4
The device has distinct advantages to both the mortgagor and the
mortgagee. It eliminates the expense to the borrower of executing later
mortgages for each new advance. In addition the borrower saves in-
711 (1929) ; Taft v. Stoddard, 142 Mass. 545, 8 N. E. 586 C1886). Cf. Berger v.
Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S. W. 2d 419, 421 (1929) ("Mortgages of this
character have been denominated 'Anaconda mortgages' and are well named thus,
as by their broad and general terms they enwrap the unsuspecting debtor in the
folds of indebtednss embraced and secured in the mortgage which he did not
contemplate, and to extend them further than has already been done would, in our
opinion, be dangerous and unwise.")
Whether or not a particular loan or advance comes within the coverage of a
mortgage to secure future advances will depend on the court's interpretation of the
contract between the parties. E.g., in Cotton v. First Nat. Bank, 228 Ala. 311,
153 So. 225 (1934), debts for advances to third persons for which mortgagor was
liable as surety were held not within the blanket provision of the mortgage cover-
ing additional amounts "furnished me by [mortgagee] on any account." In Strong
Hardware Co. v. Gonyow, 105 Vt. 415, 168 Atl. 547 (1933), a note given by the
mortgagor to a third person and indorsed to the mortgagee was held not to be
covered by the mortgage covering "any and all other indebtedness of the said[mortgagor] to the said [mortgagees], their heirs and assigns, heretofore or here-
after contracted and represented by promissory notes or otherwise." Again, in
Lashbooks v. Hatheway, 52 Mich. 124, 17 N. W. 723 (1883), the court construed the
language of the mortgage to mean that it covered indebtednesses of the mortgagor
to the assignees of the mortgagee. See also First Bank and Trust Co. of Ottumwa
v. Welch, 219 Iowa 318. 258 N. W. 96 (1935). In that case, a husband and
wife executed a promissory note to a bank and then gave a mortgage to secure
it and additional sums "whether now due or hereafter accruing to said mortgagee,
and all advances of money or interest or prior liens." The court held that the
husband and wife had not made their interests in the real estate subject to the
individual indebtednesses of either.
A recent Ohio decision has held that in order to contend that an advance is
covered by a mortgage to secure future advances, the mortgagee must manifest a
reliance on the mortgage. Second Nat. Bank of Warren v. Boyle, 155 Ohio St.
482, 99 N. E. 2d 474 (1951) (mortgagee held to rely only on a subsequent chattel
mortgage). The general rule seems to be otherwise. Northhampton Nat. Bank
v. Holland, 126 Pa. Super. 597, 190 Atl. 483 (1937). In view of the conflict,
mortgagees are well-advised to make known their reliance on the mortgage.
a Stephens v. Ahrens. 179 Cal. 743, 178 Pac. 863 (1919) ; Nussenfeld v. Smith,
110 Conn. 438, 148 Atl. 388 (1930); Kentucky Lumber and Mill Work Co. v.
Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co., 182 Ky. 244. 211 S. W. 765 (1919);
New Baltimore Loan and Savings Assoc. v. Tracey, 142 Md. 211, 120 Atl. 441(1923) ; Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass. 121, 100 N. E. 1095 (1913)
Creigh Sons & Co. v. Jones, 103 Neb. 706. 173 N. W. 687 (1919).
"Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43 (1881); McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt.
300 (1844) ; Ladd v. Lookout Distilling Co.. 147 Ala. 173, 40 So. 610 (1906);
Hollan v. American Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 168 Ark. 939. 272 S. W.
654 (1925); Brown v. Los Angeles County, 77 Cal. App. 2d 814. 176 P. 2d 753(1947); Weiser Loan and Trust Co. v. Comerford. 41 Idaho 172, 238 Pac. 515(1925). Cf. Bagley v. Page, 57 R. I. 186, 189 Atl. 39 (1937) (note and mortgage
given by father to his daughter as security for reimbursement of expenditures made
by her for his benefit during his lifetime).
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terest on that part of a loan not put to immediate use. In building
loans, the lender-mortgagee avoids the risk involved in handing over
the full amount of the loan at a time when the property is insufficient
security.
Mortgages to secure future advances usually take one of two forms:
1) The mortgage may state that it secures a present loan definite
in amount, when actually no part or only a portion of the loan was ad-
vanced at the time of executionY Parol evidence is admissible to show
that it was, in fact, given to secure future advances and their amounts.0
This overstatement of the obligation is, of course, deceptive. At least
one court has found such overstatement constructively fraudulent as to
subsequent encumbrancers and limited the coverage to the amount of
the original outlay.7 In the majority of jurisdictions, however, the
instrument is held valid for advances not exceeding the sum specified
in the mortgage.8
2) The mortgage may expressly provide that it secures future
advances alone or in addition to a present obligation.0 The amount of
the advances to be made need not be limited.10 The indefiniteness as to
the ultimate debt in these cases is not deemed sufficient to invalidate
the instrument, although a few state statutes do require more certainty."
'Herndon v. Morris, 110 Ala. 106, 20 So. 27 (1895) ; Temple v. Hamilton, 178
Ark. 355, 11 S. W. 2d 465 (1929); Glenn v. Bailey, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 61
S. W. 959 (1901).
' Bynon v. Citizen's Bank of Carbon Hill, 221 Ala. 626, 130 So. 391 (1930)
Glassman v. Ficksman, 238 Mass. 580, 131 N. E. 316 (1921); Morton v. Jones,
136 Ky. 797, 125 S. W. 247 (1910) ; First National Bank of Raymond v. Robke,
72 Mont. 527, 235 Pac. 327 (1925). Cf. Weatherwax v. Heflin, 244 Ala. 210, 12
So. 2d 554 (1943) where the court held that an oral agreement for the extension
of the security of a mortgage to cover additional indebtedness was not enforceable
because it was a violation of the Statute of Frauds.
Matz v. Arick, 76 Conn. 388, 56 Atl. 630 (1904).
8 See note 5 supra.
' Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48, 93 So. 704 (1922) ; State Nat. Bank v. Temple
Cotton Oil Co., 185 Ark. 1011, 51 S. W. 2d 980 (1932); Hamilton v. Rhodes,
72 Ark. 625,83 S. W. 351 (1904); Buck v. Buck, 162 Cal. 300, 122 Pac. 466
(1912); Davidson v. Iwanowski, 341 Ill. App. 152, 23 N. E. 2d 139 (1950)
Carey v. Herrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 Pac. 190 (1928).
" In Batten v. Jurist, 306 Pa. 64, 158 Atl. 557 (1932), the mortgage to secure
future advances was unlimited as to time and amount. The court held it valid
as against a judgment creditor whose judgment attached after the advances were
made. The minority view is represented by Balch v. Chafee, 73 Conn. 318, 47
Atl. 327 (1900). The court there stated that as against subsequent encumbrancers,
who may take title without other notice than that given by the land records,
future advances cannot be secured by a mortgage deed which does not show any
agreement to make them nor name the amount to which they may be made.
" "No particular form is necessary to constitute a mortgage. It must clearly
indicate the creation of a lien, specify the debt to which it is given, and the
property upon which it is to take effect." GA. ConE ANN. § 67-102 (1937). Under
this statute, future advances can be made if a maximum amount is stated in the
instrument. In re Corbett, 248 Fed. 988 (Ga. D. C. 1918). Otherwise, no mort-
gage to secure future advances will be valid. Benton-Shingler Company v. Mills,
13 Ga. App. 632, 79 S. E. 755 (1913). See also MD. ANN. CODF, art. 66, § 2
(1951), Welsh v. Kuntz, 75 A. 2d 343 (Md. 1950); Baltimore High Grade Brick




The character of an advance, made pursuant to a mortgage to secure
future advances, usually controls in determining its priority as to the
intervening claim of a creditor of the mortgagor or other third party
claiming under the mortgagor. If from the agreement the advances
are found to be obligatory, i.e., the mortgagee binds himself to make
them, the mortgage will prevail over all subsequent encumbrances to
the extent of all advances irrespective of whether they were made be-
fore or after the later encumbrance.12 The courts hold that these ad-
vances constitute but a fulfillment of the contract and that each advance
relates back to the date of the execution or recordation of the mort-
gage.13
It has been held that advances made by the mortgagee in order to
protect his previous loans, i.e., advances essential to the mortgagee's
security, other than those expressly provided for in the contract, should
have priority similar to that of obligatory advances.14 Since an appli-
cation of this rule involves but an evaluation of a fact situation, it should
not be difficult to apply.
If, on the other hand, the advances are only optional, i.e., to be
made in the discretion of the mortgagee, the priority problem becomes
largely one of notice.15 Assuming that the subsequent encumbrancer
has such notice of the prior mortgage to secure future advances as the
law of the particular jurisdiction requires,'1 6 the decisive question be-
2 Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh Hall Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 234, 152 Atl. 130
(1930) ; Bullard v. Fender, 140 Fla. 448, 192 So. 167 (1929) ; Creigh Sons and
Co. v. Jones, 103 Neb. 706, 173 N. W. 687 (1919); Land Title and Trust Co.
v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213, 101 Atl. 335 (1917) ; Blackman v. Sharp, 23 R. I.
412, 50 Ati. 852 (1901) ; Eltopia Finance Co. v. Collerby, 126 Wash. 554, 219 Pac.
24 (1923).
"Machado v. Bank of Italy, 67 Cal. App. 769, 228 Pac. 369 (1924) (ad-
vances binding though definite statement of the amount to be loaned was not set
forth) ; Chartz v. Cardelli, 52 Nev. 1, 279 Pac. 761 (1929) (advances were both
optional and obligatory); Jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 15 S. W. 2d 68(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Poole v. Cage, 214 S. W. 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). Cf.
Williams v. Whitinerville Savings Bank, 283 Mass. 297, 186 N. E. 502 (1933)
(lender-mortgagee was found to be under no obligation to continue building loan
advances after default by mortgagor by failure to complete the building) ; People's
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Lynbrook v. Harkay Realty Co., 258 App. Div. 964, 16
N. Y. S. 2d 779 (1940) (court held a mechanic's lienor could not compel ad-
vances by the mortagee after mortgagor in default under terms of the agreement
and mortgage).
"' Hamilton v. Rhodes, 72 Ark. 625, 83 S. W. 351 (1904) (court stated that
a mortgagee will be protected for advances on a growing crop necessary to pro-
tect his security against waste or destruction) ; Cedar v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co.,
16 Wash. 2d 652, 134 P. 2d 437 (1943) (advances were given priority even where
mortgagee had actual notice of the junior mortgage).
'" Some courts have indicated that any advance, whether optional or obliga-
tory, made pursuant to a mortgage to secure future advances is superior to all
subsequent encumbrances and the notice question does not arise. See Witczinski
v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, 846 (1876).
10 Without such notice the mortgage would not prevail over subsequent parties
protected by the requirement of notice. This would be true whether or not the
mortgage was for future advances. Griffith v. State Mutual Building and
Loan Ass'n., 46 Ariz. 359, 51 P. 2d 246 (1935) ; Oaks v. Weingartner, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 598, 234 P. 2d 194 (1951) (materialman's lien here inferior; with record
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comes whether the mortgagee himself at the time of the making of an
advance had notice of the intervening encumbrance. The majority of
courts hold that intervening encumbrances of which the mortgagee has
actual notice take priority over the mortgage to the extent that it secures
optional advances made by the mortgagee after the notice.17 Where the
notice to the mortgagee is mere record or constructive notice, only a
minority defeat the mortgagee's priority with regard to advances made
by him thereafter. I s
An early North Carolina case seems to indicate that our court will
uphold mortgages to secure future advances. 19 The court, however, has
had no occasion to state its attitude with regard to the form such a
mortgage should take and its priority with respect to other liens.
The General Statutes Commission recently proposed that Chapter
45 relating to mortgages be amended to include a provision covering
these mortgages. 20  While the legislation offered was not to be deemed
exclusive and instruments securing future advances not conforming to
the statute were left to be governed by other applicable law, the Com-
mission did seek to establish a guide in the drafting of such instruments
and, in the case of those drawn and carried out pursuant to the statute,
determine their priority with regard to subsequent encumbrances. In
view of the widespread use of this type of mortgage and the need for
an affirmative statement of North Carolina law on the subject, the effort
seemed opportune. Unfortunately, the statute was rejected by the
North Carolina legislature at its last session.21 Similar legislation might
well be considered at a future time.
WALLACE ASHLEY, JR.
notice and examination of the deed of trust for future advances, lienor failed to in-
quire about advances) ; Berry-Beall Dry Goods Co. v. Francis, 104 Okla. 81, 230
Pac. 496 (1924).
"'Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43 (1881) ; Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa
498, 210 N. W. 559 (1926); Bunker v. Barron, 93 Me. 87, 44 Atd. 372 (1899);
Union Nat. Bank v. Melburn and Stoddard Co., 7 N. D. 201, 73 N. W. 527(1897) ; Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash. 2d 29, 116 P. 2d 253 (1941).
Cf. Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal. App. 149, 186 Pac. 831 (1919).
" Ladue v. Detroit and M. R. Co., 13 Mich 380 (1865); Kubn v. Southern
Ohio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N. E. 820 (1920). For majority
view which requires actual notice, see cases, note 17 supra.
1 In Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343, 346 (1876), the court said, "It is clear
that a man may lawfully mortgage his property to secure future and contingent
debts, and that he does so is not of itself proof of a fraudulent intent." The
mortgage in his case placed no limit on the amount of the futtire debts secured,
but did have a time limit in which the debts were to be contracted. In McAdams
v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914), the court cited with
approval a case involving a mortgage to secure future advances.
20 S. B. 27, 1953 General Assembly. Liens on crops for advances were ex-
pressly excluded by the Commission. They are covered by N. C. GrN. STAT. § 44-
52 et seq. (1943 Recomp. 1950).
21 The bill was passed by the Senate, but was voted- down on the floor of the
House of Representatives during the closing weeks of the 1953 session.
[Vol. 31
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Restraint of Trade-Fair Trade Acts-Constitutionality
Fair Trade Acts' authorize resale price maintenance-a form of
price fixing. These Acts intitially were received favorably by most
courts2 but recently some have encountered judicial snags.
In 1937, Congress, in passing the Miller-Tydings Amendment8 to
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' sanctioned resale price maintenance
agreements in the "fair trade" states in transactions involving interstate
commerce. In 1951 the United States Supreme Court in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.5 dealt "fair trade" a severe blow by
holding that the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not authorize the
enforcement of fair trade agreements against non-signers in interstate
transactions. 6 In addition the Court held that this Act authorized only
minimum prices and did not sanction absolute prices. 7  This decision,
coupled with Sunbeam v. Wentlings which concluded that out of state
mail order sales when made by a non-signing Pennsylvania retailer were
not subject to the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, drained the Acts of
most of their vitality.9
In 1952 Congress passed the McGuire Act 0 which expressly over-
ruled the Schwegnann and Wentling decisions by validating the non-
signers clause, authorizing both minimum and absolute prices, and de-
claring regulation of out of state retail sales was not an undue burden
on commerce.
' Between 1931 and 1941 Fair Trade Acts were passed in 45 states. These
Acts uniformly purported to validate agreements between manufacturers and
wholesalers or retailers whereby the manufacturer protected his trade mark,
brand or name by stipulating the price at which the retailer was to sell the
article. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7056 (1953). The North Carolina statute
is N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 through 66-57 (1943, recompiled 1950) ; 15 N. C. L.
R-v. 367 (1937).
'Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936); Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942); Ely
Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N: C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 428 (1939).
15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
'Ibid.
341 U. S. 384, 388 (1951). The majority opinion in this case states, "The
omission of the non-signers provision from the federal law (Miller-Tydings) is
fatal to respondent's position unless we are to perform a distinct legislative func-
tion by reading into the Act a provision that was meticulously omitted from it."
Three justices dissented.
'A typical non-signers clause is: "Willfully and knowingly advertising . . .
or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered
into pursuant to this article, whether the person so . . . selling is or is not a
party to such a contract is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 66-56 (1943, recompiled 1950).
(Italics added).
In the 45 states that passed Fair Trade Acts minimum prices were authorized
in thirty states while fifteen authorized absolute prices. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
7001 (1953).
8 341 U. S. 944 (1951).
'H. R. RaP. No. 1437, 82d Cong.. 2d Sess. (1952).
" 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1953).
1953]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Although several state courts, including North Carolina," had up-
held the constitutionality of their Fair Trade Acts, the Florida Supreme
Court refused to follow the well established pattern. Instead, in 1949 it
declared the Florida Act violative of the state constitution in that it
was an excessive exercise of the police power.1 2 However a subsequent
re-enactment intended to remedy the constitutional objection has yet
to be passed on by the Florida Court.13 Subsequently, Michigan, in a
decision rendered after the Schwegmann case and prior to the McGuire
Act, announced that the Michigan Fair Trade Act was violative of the
due process clause of the state constitution and further that the authori-
zation of resale price maintenance agreements exceeded the police
power of the state.14 .
More recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia has joined the dis-
senting group. In Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Limited,'5
a case in which the defendant was a non-signing retailer who sold the
plaintiff-manufacturer's silverware at a price less than that expressed in
contracts between the plaintiff and other retailers, the Georgia Supreme
Court declared that the Georgia Fair Trade Act 0 contravened both the
due process clause of the state constitution 7 and the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution.' 8 On the federal issue the Court utilized
a novel twist in "fair trade" litigation by reasoning that when the
Georgia Act was passed in 193710 it violated the Sherman Act as it then
stood2 0 and the subsequent enactment of the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts did not operate to validate the Georgia Act inasmuch
as it was void ab initio.
" Pyroil Sales Co. v. The Pep Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 194 (1936)
Burroughs Welcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596,
24 A. 2d 841 (1942); Seagrams-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing
Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936); International Cellucotton Products v.
Kraus Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard
Brothers, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937) ; Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorf-
man, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937) ; Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C.
163, 4 S. E. 2d 228 (1939); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S. D.
523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940) ; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10
Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941) ; Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225
Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937) (except a provision exempting non-profit
cooperatives).
2 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp, 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949)
28 N. C. L. Rzv. 336 (1950).
'3 Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
,Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109,
54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952).
" 75 S. E. 2d 161 (Ga. 1953).
" GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-401 through 106-408 (1937).
GA. CoxsT., Art. I, Sect. 1, f II. " U. S. CONsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
Georgia participated in the legislative "avalanche" that saw 28 states pass
Fair Trade Acts in 1937. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 17056 (1953).
20 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946). ". . . every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy




In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court of Georgia ignored
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp.P which specifically upheld
the right of Illinois to authorize resale price maintenance agreements in
intrastate commerce. At the time of the Old Dearborn decision the
law was well established that such practices in interstate commerce
were illegal22 and the twenty-eight states, including Georgia, which
passed Fair Trade Acts in the year after the Old Dearborn case could
have intended to validate only such agreements as involved intrastate
transactions. For this reason the application of the void ab initio
doctrine in this situation seems questionable.
The courts of twenty-nine states have yet to pass on the constitu-
tionality of their Fair Trade Acts. 23  Of the twenty-nine all but four
were passed prior to the Miller-Tydings Amendment, and all twenty-
nine were enacted prior to the McGuire Act. If the reasoning of the
Georgia Court on the federal issue should be followed by these states
the Acts passed prior to Miller-Tydings are totally void. The other
four would become practically impotent for without the benefit of the
McGuire Act the non-signers clauses-the heart of the Acts-would be
inapplicable in interstate commerce. However, it is unlikely that
these twenty-nine states will follow the reasoning of the Georgia Su-
preme Court and thereby declare their Acts void ab initio in whole or in
part.
The alternate ground on which the Georgia opinion is based is less
controversial. In holding that the Georgia Fair Trade Act violated the
Georgia Constitution the Supreme Court of Georgia employed the same
technique as had previously been applied by the highest courts of
Florida and Michigan. Opponents of "fair trade," encouraged by these
decisions may seek expeditious consideration of the Fair Trade Acts in
those states yet to pass on the question. There is little, if any, indica-
tion that states which previously have upheld the constitutionality of
their Acts are ready to take a contrary view. Recently, the Supreme
Court of New York24 and a Federal District Court in Louisiana2 5
reiterated that the Acts of those states were constitutional. In addition
the highest courts of New Jersey2 and California2 7 have restated the
validity of the non-signers clauses in the Acts of those states.
The McGuire Act also has been under attack in both state and
21299 U. S. 183 (1936).
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.. 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
2 CCH TRADa REG. REP. 118004 through 8964 (1953).
24 General Electric Co. v. Klein on the Square, Inc., TRADR REG. REP. CUR-
RENT DEcisioNs, 67,443 (1953).
" Ely Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (1953).
"Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 95 Atl. 2d 391 (N. J. 1953).
27 The Cal-Dak Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 254 Pac. 2d 497 (Calif. 1953).
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federal courts. Schwegmann Brothers, Louisiana retailers and long
time foe of "fair trade," challenged this Act on grounds that it violates
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution and constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power to private individuals. The
Louisiana Federal District Court in Ely Lilly Co. v. Schwegmann
Bros.25 upheld the constitutionality of the Act. In General Electric v.
Klein on the Square29 the New York Supreme Court declared the
McGuire Act constitutional as not being in contravention of the due
process or equal protection clauses and not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Ultimately the United States Supreme Court may
rule on the constitutionality of the McGuire Act and its sanction of the
controversial non-signers clause. 30 Since the Supreme Court of the
United States has already held that the Fair Trade Acts do not con-
travene the Fourteenth Admendment in intrastate commerce"' it is quite
unlikely that it will now hold the McGuire Act as applied to interstate
transactions is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Although most states will leave the economic wisdom of Fair Trade
Acts to the Legislature and hence those declaring such Acts to be un-
constitutional will remain in the minority, it is evident that the courts
will give more careful scrutiny to this legislation in the future than has
been true in the past.
JoHN RALPH CAMBRON
Unfair Competition-Export Trade Act-Unfair Methods of
Competition under Section Four
The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited concerted action by inde-
pendent exporters including the formation of trade associations for
the purpose of eliminating competition among themselves in foreign
trade.' The importance of allowing American exporters to combine
into such an association was stressed in a report submitted to Congress
by the Federal Trade Commission in 1916.2 Spurred by this report,
2'TRADE REG. REP., CURRENT COURT DECISIONS, ff 67,443 (1953).
D 109 F. Supp. 269 (1953).
" The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed directly on the
constitutionality of the Miller-Tydings Act.
" Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers, Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936).
' The Sherman Act prohibits: "Every contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade.... ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 STAT.
693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
'Public hearings were conducted in 16 cities; several thousand questionnaires
were sent out to interested individuals and firms; American consuls and com-
mercial attaches sent in reports; a study of the ramifications of foreign cartel
arrangements was made. On June 30, 1916, this report on Cooperation in Amer-
can Export Trade was submitted to Congress. This report may be found in
EXPORT PRIcEs AND EXPORT CARTELS (WEBB-PoMERENE ASSOCIATIONS) 113-118
(TNEC Monograph 6, 1941). See also Love, The Export Trade Act, 8 Go.
WAsHr. L. REv. 608 (1940).
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Congress enacted the Export Trade Act (otherwise known as the
Webb-Pomerene Act) on April 10, 1918.3 The terms of the Webb-
Pomerene Act specifically enable independent exporters to combine
into an association and set forth the conditions under which such an
association may be organized. Congress, however, was aware of the
'dangers inherent in permitting such a combination, and therefore in-
cluded certain restrictive provisions in the Webb-Pomerene Act to gov-
ern the activities of these associations. 4 Section 4,5 one of the restrictive
provisions, prohibits unfair methods of competition in export trade.
Unlike the other sections of the Act, it embraces not only the conduct
of export associations but also the acivities of any individual business-
man engaged in export trade.
Section 4 reads:
"The prohibition against 'unfair methods of competition' and
the remedies provided for enforcing said prohibition contained
in the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be construed as ex-
tending to unfair methods of competition in export trade, even
though the acts constituting such unfair methods are done without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 6
Both the 1916 Report7 to Congress by the Federal Trade Commission
and the ensuing legislative history8 of the Act lend weight to the con-
clusion that the conduct of single firms as well as export associations
are within the purview of Section 4. In United States v. United States
Alkali Export Ass'n., Inc., et al.,9 it was stated that "The effect of Sec-
tion 4 . . . was to condemn such 'unfair methods of competition'
wherever committed . . . this section [does not] draw any distinction
between organizations organized under previous sections of the Webb
'40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. §§ 61-65 (1946). For two years Congress
gave the provisions of this act a thorough examination. In 1916, Representative
Edwin Y. Webb from North Carolina introduced H. R. 16707, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916) and H. R. 17350, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1916). Again in 1917
Representative Webb introduced H. R. 2316, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) (this
bill was eventually passed by both houses), ,and Senator Atlee Pomerene from
Ohio introduced S. 634, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
'40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 62 (1946); 40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15
U. S. C. § 63 (1946); 40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 64 (1946); 40 STAT.
517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946).
'40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 64 (1946).
'Id.
'Report on Cooperation in American Export Trade as reported in EXPORT
PRICES AND EXPORT CARTELS (WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS) 117-118 (TNEC
Monograph 6, 1941).
' See 55 CON. REc. 2786 (1917) ; 55 CONG. RE. 3577 (1917) ; 56 CONG. RFc.
69 (1917) ; 56 CONG. RFc. 111 (1917) ; 56 CoNG. REc. 171 (1917); 56 CONG: REC.
173 (1917).
'United States v. United States Alkali Expbrt Ass'n., Inc., et al., 86 F. Supp.
59 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
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Act and other corporations engaging in export trade."'10 Although the
Federal Trade Commission has brought several proceedings under
Section 4, none have been directed against an export association.,,
It is interesting to note that the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission is confined to investigatory functions under all the pro-
visions of the Webb-Pomerene Act except Section 4.12 Under Section
4 the Commission is empowered to determine that unfair methods of
competition have been employed and then to command the violator to
cease and desist. 1
3
Since 1918 the Federal Trade Commission has proceeded against
individual respondents only twelve times under this Section. Six com-
plaints resulted in cease and desist orders and six complaints were dis-
missed. The following practices have been attacked as "unfair methods
of competition" in export trade: labeling condensed milk cans so that
they mislead the consumer as to the place of manufacture ;14 misrepre-
senting the quality of apples ;15 misrepresenting products as to certain
iron and steel specialities ;16 selling inferior or worthless automobiles and
automobile parts as new ;17 filling orders for wheat with grades inferior
to that specified ;18 representing and selling as new, certain trucks, auto-
mobiles, and parts which were unusable ;19 failing to adhere to contract
obligations in the exportation of coal ;20 employing threats of an infringe-
O Id. at 67.
" Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); Nestle
Food Co., Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919) ; Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923) ;
Carnick Bros. Co., 6 F. T. C. 515 (1923); Pacific Commercial Co., et al., 10
F. T. C. 458 (1926); Barnes-Ames Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 460 (1926); M. Rea
Gano, 11 F. T. C. 492 (1928); Robert M. Lease Co., Inc., et al., 12 F. T. C. 85
(1928) ; Edmond Waterman et al., 12 F. T. C. 509 (1928) ; Bond Bros. & Co., Inc.,
15 F. T. C. 445 (1931); Export Petroleum Co. of Calif., Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119
(1932); Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F. T. C. 67 (1939).
1" Section 5 of the Webb-Pomerene Act gives the Federal Trade Commission
authority to investigate any conduct by an export association which may restrain
domestic or export trade, to make recommendations for correction of this con-
duct, and to refer its recommendations and findings to the Attorney General. 40
STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946). In United States Alkali Export
Ass'n., Inc., et al., 325 U. S. 196, 210 (1945) the Supreme Court stated "that the
only function of the Federal Trade Commission under § 5 of the Webb-Pomerene
Act is to investigate, recommend and report. It can give no remedy. It can
make no controlling finding of law or fact. Its recommendation need not be
followed by any court or administrative or executive officer."
"3 In Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) the
respondent appealed from a cease and desist order by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Joseph G. Branch, 36 F. T. C. 1 (1943), and the Court of Appeals for
the seventh circuit affirmed the order.
'Nestle Food Co., Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919) (cease and desist order
issued).
15 Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923) (cease and desist order issued).
" Carnick Bros. Co., 6 F. T. C. 515 (1923) (complaint dismissed).
"' Pacific Commercial Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 458 (1926) (complaint dis-
missed).Barnes-Ames Co., et al., 10 F. T. C. 460 (1926) (complaint dismissed).
19 M. Rea Gano, 11 F. T. C. 492 (1928) (complaint dismissed).




ment suit against competitors in the sale of certain fruits ;21 misrepre-
senting the quality and sale terms of bailed newspapers ;22 failing to fill.
gasoline containers to capacity and thus allowing respondent's vendees,.
in selling to the ultimate consumer, to misrepresent the quantity of gaso-
line being sold ;23 and misrepresenting the quality and source of certain
chemicals and other material used in warfare.2 1
Of the twelve proceedings, only one, Branch v. Federal Trade Com-
Mission,25 reached the federal courts. In this case the charge was ad-
vertising falsely the qualifications and academic standards of a corre-
spondence school which extended its services into Latin America. The
petitioner claimed that the Commission did not have jurisdictionbecause
he was not engaged in commerce and because the acts in question took
place in Latin America. The court repudiated these arguments by
ruling that (1) sending "books, instructions, and written examinations
. . . is 'commerce' within the meaning of the Constitution and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act"26 and, (2) the Federal Trade Commission
has the power "to protect the petitioner's competitors from . . . unfair
practices, begun in the United States and consummated in Latin
America." 27 In finding a violation of Section 4, the Court of Appeals
for the seventh circuit had to determine that export trade, as -defined
in the Webb-Pomerene Act, was involved.28
Another significant feature of the Branch case is the fact that the
court made it clear that Section 5 of .the Federal Trade Commission
Act had also been violated.2 9 If acts committed in foreign commerce,
are condemned by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as
well as Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, is there any necessity for
resorting to Section 4? The legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene
Act indicates that Section 4 was probably inserted primarily to allay
the fears of those who opposed combinations in export trade, to prevent
export associations from using their position unfairly against individual
exporters.30  However, as previously indicated, the Commission has
yet to direct Section 4 against an export association. Inconsistent as
it may seem, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
broader than Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act. While Section
" Edmond Waterman et al., 12 F. T. C. 509 (1928) (complaint dismissed).
" Bond Bros. & Co., Inc. 15 F. T. C. 445 (1931) (complaint dismissed).
"' Export Petroleum Co. of Calif., Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119 (1932) (cease and
desist order issued).
"' Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F.T.C. 67 (1939) (cease and desist
order issued).
"
2 Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). The
cease and desist order in the case was obtained under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Joseph G. Branch, 36 F. T. C. 1 (1943). Section 4 of
the Webb-Pomerene Act was introduced into the proceeding when the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit.
2' Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1944).
27 Id. at 35. 2- Id. at 36.
20 Id. at 35. 20 See note 8 mipra.
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4 contains the language "unfair methods of competition,"3 ' thus re-
quiring that the act complained of not only being unfair but also
a method of competition in export trade.3 2  Section 5 now reads
"unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce."33  This latter addition to Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act has been interpreted to mean that
it is only necessary to show an unfair act in commerce. 4  It appears
that the Federal Trade Commission can rely on Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act entirely in assailing inequitable practices in
export trade. However, it is the Commission's opinon that without
Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act there would be doubt as to their
jurisdiction over acts committed in foreign countries.35
Whether the Commission will rely on Section 4 of the Webb-
Pomerene Act of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is
apparent that the enforcement of the anti-trust laws in the area of in-
ternational trade is definitely increasing. Two recent cases prosecuted
by the Attorney General under the Sherman Act clearly indicate that
export associations organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act are not
exempted from the Sherman Act for all purposes.3 6 If the acts com-
plained of amount to a restraint of trade, the association is still subject
to prosecution by the Attorney General.3 7  Thus it must be noted
that the fact that the Federal Trade Commission may proceed under
Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act or Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act does not necessarily preclude the Attorney General
from proceeding under the Sherman Act. Although it is difficult to
predict the extent to which Section 5 will be employed, it may be
3140 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 65 (1946) [emphasis added].
"The terms "unfair methods of competition" in Section 4 of the Webb-
Pomerene Act are the same terms that were found in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act prior to the Wheeler-Lea amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act in 1938. The meaning of "unfair methods of competition" was
determined in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931).
"38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended by 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45
(1946) [emphasis added].
" The terms "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," as added to
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Wheeler-Lea Act in
1938, have been interpreted in Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. Federal Trade
Commission, 122 F. 2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal
Trade Commission, 158 F. 2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946) and many other cases.
" In correspondence to the writer of this note, dated April 24, 1953, the
Federal Trade Commission stated: "Section 4 of the Export Trade Act was
passed because there was some doubt as to whether the Commission had juris-
diction under the Federal Trade Commission Act over acts committed in foreign
countries. There was no doubt, however, of the Commission's jurisdiction in
cases involving imports or exports because the law has always applied to 'com-
merce' which includes both interstate and foreign."
" United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n., Inc., et al., 86 F. Supp.
59. (S. D. N. Y. 1949); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co.. et al., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. C. Mass. 1950).1 7 d.
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used to protect competitors and foreign consumers from American ex-




The specific legatee of an automobile sought to collect the proceeds
of an insurance policy on the automobile after an accident in which it
was damaged. The testatrix sustained injuries in the accident which
resulted in her subsequent death. The insurance company paid to the
executor the value of the automobile after the accident and took pos-
session of it as salvage. The court held that the executor was entitled
to the proceeds of the policy and that the legatee was entitled only to
the value of the automobile as of the death of the testatrix. The in-
surance policy was held to be a personal contract between the testatrix
and the insurer, hence the legatee had no interest therein.1
The case clearly illustrates how the relationship of the death of a
testator and the damage or destruction of a specific legacy may produce
varied results. That is, since the rights of the legatee are ordinarily de-
termined as of the death of the testator,2 it will be important whether
the damage or destruction of the legacy or -devise occurred prior to
or subsequent to the testator's death.
In the first instance, i.e., where the damage.or destruction occurred
prior to the death, the law of ademption controls. 3 Without elaborating
on the intricacies of ademption, suffice it to say that ordinarily ademp-
tion is defined as the taking away of the subject matter of a specific
legacy 4 or devise by its destruction, or its disposition by the testator in
his lifetime. 5 Therefore, if the specific legacy or devise is damaged or
8 This would certainly seem to be the conclusion to be drawn from Branch
v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Nestle Food Co.,
Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919); Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923); Robert
M. Lease Co., Inc., et al., 12 F. T. C. 85 (1928) ; Export Petroleum Co. of Calif.,
Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119 (1932); Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F. T. C. 67
(1939)
'It re Barry's Estate, 252 P. 2d 437 (Okla., 1952). Accord, Ind. Mutual
Cyclone Ins. Co. v. Rinard, 102 Ind. App. 546, 200 N. E. 452 (1936) ; Converse
v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 315 Mass. 544, 53 N. E. 2d 841 (1944) ;
In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937); III
AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937) ;III
AMERICAN LA W OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952) where it is stated: "The right
to recover on a fire insurance policy when the loss occurred in the lifetime of
decedent passes to his personal representatives, as in case of any other chose in
action; this recovery is for the general benefit of the estate and not for the
devisee or others entitled to the land."
'28 R. C. L. WILLS § 341 (1921).
'Green v. Green, 231 N. C. 707, 58 S. E. 2d 722 (1950) ; Tyner v. Meadows,
215 N. C. 733, 3 S. E. 2d 264 (1939) ; King v. Sellars, 194 N. C. 533, 140 S. E.
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destroyed prior to the testator's death, the rules of ademption will op-
erate to extinguish or limit what the legatee takes under the will. It
logically follows also that in this instance the legatee will not be en-
titled to the proceeds of insurance on the specific legacy, since he has
sustained no loss.
Where the damage or destruction to the specific legacy occurs
after the death of the testator, there is, of course, no ademption, and
the insurance collected by the executor will be held in trust for the
legatee who has sustained the loss.6 In this situation, the legacy
existed in its normal condition at the time of the testator's death, hence
the legatee is entitled to its fair value at that time.
The most perplexing problems arise when the available facts indicate
that the death of the testator and the damage or destruction of the legacy
were apparently simultaneous. In one New York case, 7 the testatrix died
in the sinking of a ship and the specific legacy was lost in the same
sinking. The court, in awarding to the legatee certain proceeds to
cover the value of the chattel, briefly held that "there was no de-
struction, selling or disposition of the articles in question during the life-
time of the testatrix." An English case,8 decided on somewhat the
same facts, reached a result contrary to the New York case. The
testator and the specific legacy were lost at sea and the court held that
there was an ademption of the legacy, hence the insurance proceeds
belonged to the estate. The reasons given for the decisions in both
cases were brief and no basis for the contrary results can be determined
from either case. It is possible that the New York court could have
considered the fact that the property was insoluble and still in existence
at the time of the testarix' death, thus preventing ademption. If such
was the case, the court would probably have reached a contrary 'decision
if the specific legacy and the testator had perished in a conflagration re-
sulting in the complete destruction of the legacy. It is submitted that
the New York court arrived at the more equitable decision in the
matter. However, due to the varied circumstances that may surround
an apparently simultaneous death of the testator and destruction of the
legacy, the court would probably refuse to indulge in any presumptions
and the burden would fall on the legatee, in claiming the proceeds from
the legacy, to prove that there has been no ademption.9 On the other
91 (1927) ; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N. C. 183 (1885) ; Taylor v. Bond, 45 N. C.
5 (1851); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1513 et seq. (1941).
' Culbertson v. Cox, 29 Minn. 309, 13 N. W. 177 (1882) ; Millard v. Beaumont,
194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S. W. 547 (1916); Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253
(1863) ; Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 133 (3d.
ed. 1951).
'In re Shymer's Estate, 136 Misc. 334, 242 N. Y. Supp. 234 (Sur. 1930).
'Durant v. Friend, 5 De G & S 343, 64 Eng. Rep. 1145 (1852).
'Note, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 1311 (1930).
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hand, the courts seem to favor the construction of a will which prevents
the failure of a bequest or legacy.' 0 Certainly that construction should
have some weight when there has been no intent or voluntary act on
the part of the testator to cause an ademption, as where the testator
and specific legacy perish simultaneously.
The testator by making a specific legacy intends a real benefit to the
legatee, and if the legacy is defeated through operation of law rather
than by his own act, his intent may be said to have been defeated. Even
if the legacy is defeated by his own act, there is no conclusive intent on
his part that the legacy be adeemed. Of course, this undesirable result
has been alleviated somewhat by the courts in construing the legacy
as a general or demonstrative legacy if at all possible." Even though
the legacy is clearly a specific one which has been destroyed, it would
seem that in some instances the legatee would be entitled to the pro-
ceeds therefrom on the basis of the testator's implied intention. That is,
if it can be implied from the "four corners" of the will that the testator
intended some fixed pattern of distribution among the natural subjects
of his bounty, there would appear to be no objection to allowing the
proceeds of adeemed property to be paid to a legatee or devisee.12
Hence, by construction, the apparent intent of the testator may be served
and ademption prevented.
Further, attempts have been made in some jurisdictions to remedy
the situation by statute. 13  Kentucky's statute' 4 seems to be the most
liberal of the statutes on the subject, but it operates to prevent ademp-
tion only where the heirs of the testator are concerned. In one case
decided under the statute,'5 it was held that a specific devise of a farm
to the testator's heirs was not adeemed by a sale of it during the tes-
tator's lifetime and the devisee-heirs were entitled to the proceeds. It
1 Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 119 So. 678 (1929) ; Palmer v. French, 326
Mo. 710, 32 S. W. 2d 591 (1930) ; In re Strasenburgh's Will, 136 Misc. 91, 242
N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sur. 1930) ; In re Levas Estate, 33 Wash. 2d 530, 206 P. 2d 482(1949).
" Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. 2d 984 (D. C. 1938) ; Conway v. Shea, 282 Mass.25, 183 N. E. 771 (1933); Methodist Church v. Thomas, 235 Mo. App. 671, 145S. W. 2d 157 (1941) ; In re Liell's Will, 139 Misc. 513, 247 N. Y. Supp. 386 (Sur.
1931) ; Smith v. Smith, 192 N. C. 687, 690, 135 S. E. 855, 857 (1927) ("If the
words will be satisfied by anything of the same kind, not owned by the testator,
the legacy is general.").
12 See Trust Co. v. Miller, 223 N. C. 1, 4, 25 S. E. 2d 177, 178 (1943) ; Nooe
v. Vannoy, 59 N. C. 185, 189 (1860).
"ALA. CODE ANN. § 61-15 (1940) (if the testator conveys his interest in the
devised property and later acquires a new interest, the new interest passes unlessit appears from the will or other instruments that the testator intended a revoca-
tion of the will) ; GA. CODE ANx. § 113-818 (1937) (no ademption if the testator
exchanges property devised for other of like character) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.360(1948) (when property devised to an heir is thereafter converted, the devisee shall
receive the value of the devise unless a contrary intent appear from the will or
other evidence).
S"Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.360 (1948).
" Westover's Ex'rx v. Westover, 313 Ky. 545, 233 S. W. 2d 105 (1950).
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has been suggested that "anti-ademption statutes" could be passed, as
we now have "anti-lapse statutes," to prevent the legacy's failing;1
but apparently no state has been willing to go so far to remedy the
situation. Even if it were found under the above remedies that the
legatee or devisee were entitled to the proceeds of the legacy, query
as to whether insurance proceeds would be considered proceeds of the
legacy or of a separate contract.
It would seem that the most practical remedy is to be found in the
will itself. Thus, if the testator were to provide in his will that if the
specific legacy is not a part of his estate at his death, the legatee is to
take other rights, such as the proceeds of the property, the property
purchased with the proceeds of the property, or the insurance derived
from its damage or destruction in lieu of the property specifically be-
queathed, the problem would be practically extinct except for the matter
of tracing proceeds. The intent of the testator can best be served when
drafting his will by informing him of the possibility of ademption and
the remedies available.
ELTON C. PRIDGEN
Witnesses-Competency of Husband and Wife-Effect of Validity
and Purpose of Marriage
Defendant was on trial for violation of the immigration laws. He
had entered into a marriage in France with an honorably discharged
veteran for the purpose of bringing himself within the language of the
War Brides Act1 so as to gain entrance to the United States. At the
time of the marriage both parties understood its limited purpose; it was
agreed that a divorce would be obtained after the marriage had served
this purpose; and the wife received a sum of money for participating
in the plan. At the trial the government offered the wife as a witness
against the defendant. He objected on the ground that she was his wife
pursuant to a French marriage and therefore incompetent to testify
against him. Held: The validity or invalidity of the French marriage
is immaterial. The relationship was entered into with no intention of
the parties to live together as husband and wife, but only for the pur-
pose of using the ceremony in a scheme to defraud. The marriage was
a sham, empty, phony affair, and the ostensible spouse was competent
to testify against the defendant. 2
"0 Mecham, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 514 (1948):
1TI AmERIcAN LAW oF PROPERTY § 14.13 (1952).
'See 59 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U. S. C § 232 (1947) which provides in effect
that alien spouses of United States citizens serving in, or having an honorable
discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United States during the
Second World War, shall be admitted to the United States.2 Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481 (1953).
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The federal courts have generally3 followed the rule that spouses are
incompetent as witnesses against each other in criminal actions unless
the defendant is being tried for violence upon the person of the offered
witness spouse.4 The principal decision recognized this rule to be the
existing law, but refused to apply it because the marriage was a sham.
The language of the decision-so-called narriage, ostensible spouse, and
sham nmarriage 5-indicates that the refusal to declare the witness in-
competent was based on the conclusion that the marriage was in fact
invalid; however, in reaching this conclusion the Court refused to con-
sider the appropriate law governingthe marriage by stating that the
legal marital status of the parties was immaterial.
In jurisdictions which adhere to the rule that spouses are incompe-
tent as witnesses against each other in criminal actions, incompetency
is treated as an incident of a valid marriage.6  The question of whether
an offered witness is the wife of an accused so as to be incompetent is
determined by the trial judge.7  However, the controlling factor in his
determination of competency is the marital status of the parties at the
time of the trial.8 If the marriage, when tested by the applicable law
'See 28 U. S. C. § 664 (1947) which provides in effect that in any prosecu-
tion for bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation, under any statute of the
United States, the lawful husband or wife of the accused shall be a competent
witness.
" U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Shore v. U. S., 174 F. 2d 838(8th Cir. 1949); Hays v. U. S., 168 F. 2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Brunner v.
U. S., 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) ; U. S. v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943); Paul v. U. S., 79 F. 2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935). But cf. Yoder v. U. S., 80
F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481, 488 (1953).
'Miles v. U. S., 103 U. S. 304 (1880); U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1949) ; Matz v. U. S., 158 F. 2d 190 (D. C. 1946) ; Elmore v. State, 140 Ala.
199, 37 So. 156 (1904) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942) ; People
v. Thornton, 235 P. 2d 227 (Cal. App. 1951) ; People v. McIntire, 213 Cal. 50, 1
P. 2d 443 (1931) ; State v. Chrismore, 223 Iowa 957, 247 N. W. 3 (1937) ; Wilson
v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19 (1948) ; Rowland v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. Rep.
164, 129 P. 2d 609 (1942) ; Scott v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. Rep. 231, 57 P. 2d 639(1936); Commonwealth v. Carey, 105 Penn. Super. Ct. Rep. 362, 161 A. 410(1932) ; Norvell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S. W. 2d 200 (1946).
"When an accused objects to the competency of an offered witness on the
grounds that she is his spouse and the prosecution challenges the validity of the
marriage, the judge holds a special preliminary examination to determine the
issue. Dickerson v. State, 30 Ga. App. 352, 118 S. E. 67 (1923) ; State v. Chris-
more, 223 Iowa 957, 274 N. W. 3 (1947); Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37
So. 2d 19 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. Carey, 105 Penn. Super. Ct. Rep. 362, 161
A. 410 (1932); State v. McGinty. 14 Wash. 2d 71. 126 P. 2d 1086 (1942);
State v. Frye, 45 Wash. 645, 80 Pac. 170 (1907). See also, U. S. v. Walker,
176 F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949) ; See Shores v. U. S., 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir.
1949) (followed procedure); Brunner v. U. S., 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948)
(followed procedure). Contra: Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S. E. 899
(1926) (issue left to jury). When the validity of the marriage is also an issue
which is material in the case being tried, the judge still rules on the issue for
the purpose of competency; however, his ruling can come only after enough evi-
dence on the issue has been presented during the course of the trial to convince
him of the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Miles v. U. S., 103 U. S. 304
(1880); Matz v. U. S.. 158 F. 2d 190 (D. C. 1946).
'Elmore v. State, 140 Ala. 199. 37 So. 156 (1904) ; State v. Chrismore "223
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governing the relationship,9 is valid, the witness thenceforth becomes
the lawful wife of the defendant, and thus is incompetent.10
The general rule is that marriages will, if valid by the laws of the
place where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other juris-
diction.1' Once the validity of the marriage is determined according to
the law at the lex loci contractus, its incidents are automatic elsewhere
1 2
unless recognition of the marriage would contravene some public policy
of the forum.
13
Hence, in the instant case, the Court's disregard of French marriage
law and local public policy controlling recognition of the marriage seems
to have been inconsistent with its recognition of the rule that spouses
are incompetent to testify against each other.14 The Court could have
used the power conferred upon if by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure15 to effectuate the suggestion ,made by several preceding
decisions 16 that the rule disqualifying spouses as witnesses against each
other in criminal action be abrogated. However, once the Court chose
not to take this step, it is difficult to comprehend how it could recognize
the rule and at the same time completely ignore the marital status-
the controlling factor in determining whether the rule should be ap-
plied. 17
As a practical matter, the same result probably could have been
reached by the Court if the marital status had been considered. A
persuasive indication that the so-called sham marriage here did not
Iowa 957, 274 N. W. 3 (1937); Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19
(1948) ; Scott v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. Rep. 231, 57 P. 2d 639 (1936) ; Norvell v.
State, 149 Tex. Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S. W. 2d 200 (1946) ; State v. McGinty, 14
Wash. 2d 71, 126 P. 2d 1086 (1942). See also, U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564.
568 (2d Cir. 1949).
9 State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942).
10 See note 6 supra.11Loughram v. Loughram, 292 U. S. 216 (1934) ; Baron v. U. S., 191 F. 2d
837 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Frozen v. Du Pont, 146 F. 2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Toshcko
Inaba v. Noyle, 36 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. 2d 927
(E. D. La. 1925) ; Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (D. Ct. D Mass. 1924) ; Great
Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918) ; In re Miller's Estate, 239
Mich. 455, 214 N. W. 428 (1927).2 Loughram v. Loughram, 292 U. S. 216 (1934) (dower award); Frozen v.
Du Pont, 146 F. 2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944) (workmen's compensation award)
Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. 2d 927 (E. D. La. 1925) (immigration privilege);
Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (D. Ct. D Mass. 1924) (immigration privilege);
Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918) (death claim of
surviving spouse).
2 Ex parte Soucek, 101 F. 2d 405 (7th Cir. 1939) ; Osoinach v. Watkins, 235
Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938); Takahashi's Estate v. Jorgensen, 113 Mont. 490,
129 P. 2d 217 (1942) ; Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 725 (1940).
14 See note 6 supra.
1" See FFD. R. CRIM. P. 26 which provides as follows: " . . The admissibility
of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience." (Italics added.)
"See Funk v. U. S., 290 U. S. 371 (1934) ; U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564
(2d Cir. 1949) ; Yoder v. U. S., 80 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
17 See note 8 supra.
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contravene any public policy in American jurisdictions is the fact that
such marriages have been held valid in many of the states.'8 However,
under French law, where the marriage ceremony was performed, when
parties go through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other than
that of creating a true relationship of husband and wife, the marriage
is treated as void.19
Aside from the means used by the Court in the instant case, there
is no particular quarrel with the ultimate result of the 'decision. The
reason usually given for the disqualification of spouses as witnesses
against each other is to protect the sanctity of the marital relationship.20
When two people marry with no intention by either to enter the rela-
tionship for the purposes commonly understood, the reason for the
rule obviously disappears. The Court here attempted to alleviate such
a situation by basing competency on the purpose of the marriage rather
than on its validity. This approach would undoubtedly be desirable
in that it would prevent the application of the rule for the sake of the
rule21 rather than for the sake of the reason underlying the rule. How-
ever, as pointed out above,22 such a departure would be inconsistent
with the rule itself since the rule applies to married persons as such.
To effectuate this approach, it would seem necessary to abandon the
rule of incompetency as to married persons and substitute therefor a
rule declaring a witness incompetent where it appears that the sanctity of
the witness's marital relationship would be affected by allowing her to
testify. The dissenting opinion in the principal case23 recognized the
necessity of. determining the invalidity of the marriage according to the
proper law governing the relationship in order to be consistent with the
rule of incompetency and summed the situation up as follows: "When-
ever a court has a case where behavior that obviously is sordid can be
proved to be criminal only with great 'difficulty, the effort to bridge the
gap is apt to produce bad law."24
ERVIN I. BAER
', See Schilbi v. Schilbi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A. 2d 831 (1949) (legitimizing
child) ; De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (1915) (nullification of employment
contract) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N. E. 673 (1934) (retention of
position and salary increase); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1942)
(protection of reputation) ; Erickson v. Erickson, 38 N. Y. S. 2-1 588 (1942)(legitimizing child); Campbell v. Moore. 189 S. C. 497, 1 S. E. 2d 784 (1939)
(legitimizing child). For a compilation of cases involving limited purpose marri-
ages see 14 A. L. R. 2d 624 (1950).
"0 1 RABEL, CoxrFcr OF LAWS 272 (Draper-Yntema, ed. 1945).
.0 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d ed. 1940).
"1 See U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949) (accused had married
witness solely for the purpose of defrauding her of money; the parties had
separated; and reconciliation seemed highly unlikely) ; Norvell v. State, 149 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S. W. 2d 200 (1946) (accused married witness for the exclusive
purpose of rendering her incompetent to testify against him).
22 See note 14 supra.
2' See Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481, 490 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
24 Ibid.
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